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Small private woodlots present barriers to attainment of a number of
recognized forest policy objectives, due to their fragmented size, dispersed spatial
distribution, and the diverse goals of their owners. This fragmentation and
diversity is particularly problematic for (1) the reliable production of adequate
forest products supply, and (2) the more recent goal of maintaining forest ecology
values. Collective forest management offers the potential to address many of the
economies of scale, market, information, and contractor reliability problems
deterring proper forest management. Collective management also provides an
administratively efficient, reliable, and financially effective mechanism for
delivering forestry assistance. Collective woodlot management has not been
widely adopted or successful in other regions. Nova Scotia's Group Venture
program, however, has successfully created eighteen companies and cooperatives
collectively managing shareholders woodlots. This paper analyzes the formation,
operations and organization of one particularly independent and productive
Group Venture, Conform. to examine the conditions that shape its success. More
specifically, this paper evaluates the impact of member characteristics, physical
resource conditions, market conditions, and internal rules and organization on the
success of this case of collective forest management.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Small woodlot owners have presented a persistent barrier to the attainment
of a number of social goals in the forest management. Fragmented size and
spatial distribution of woodlots and diverse goals of owners make inducing
coherent and coordinated action among them a difficult problem for forest policy
makers. Traditionally, "the small-woodlot-owner problem" has primarily focussed
on low productivity on non-industrial private woodlots, and its impact on the long-
term supply of forest products for society.' More recently, concerns have grown
over the effect of management upon forest ecology values, with some observers
particularly concerned about the impacts of stand-by-stand management models
on the maintenance of large-scale regional ecological systems.2
The "small-woodlot-owner problem" results from both the fragmented size
and spatial distribution of woodlots and diverse goals of woodlot owners. Land
fragmentation results in poor management economies of scale, small and
infrequent harvests, and potentially difficult and expensive woodlot access, making
investment in management services or equipment economically unattractive.
Reinforcing this disposition toward non-management are changing values and
attitudes of small woodlot owners, who are increasingly value their woodlots more
for firewood, investment and amenity values than forest products production.
Declining management knowledge of woodlot owners and the mistrust of
contractors and foresters present additional barriers to proper management. The
Clawson 1979; Sedjo and Ostermeir 1977; Task Force of the Society of American
Foresters 1978; Blouin 1988.
2 Sonner 1993; Baskerville and Regier 1986.
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result is that many woodlots are not managed, or are sporadically harvested in an
unsound manner.
Broad recognition of "the small-woodlot-owner problem" during the 1970s
led to a burst of programs and policies to increase small woodlot management.
Education, cooperative extension, tax incentives, grants and cost-sharing were
among the government responses. Little attention was directed toward the
potential of collective forest management to address some of the economies of
scale, market, information, contractor reliability, and owner apathy problems
deterring proper forest management. Based upon programs in Quebec and
Sweden, Nova Scotia created the Group Venture program which has assisted in
the development of eighteen collective management companies in the Province.
Collective management provides the government with an administratively efficient,
reliable, and financially effective mechanism for delivering forestry assistance.
Increased woodlot management is encouraged by providing woodlot owners with a
more attractive management option than those already available. Thus, long-term
supply concerns are addressed by encouraging more woodlot owners to manage
woodlots for production, and future resource conditions are improved by
regulating the funded treatments. Collective management also potentially
improves rural economic conditions by providing woodlot owners, typically
disadvantaged by provincial forest policies promoting industrial producers, with an
opportunity to increase economic returns from their woodlots.
Group Ventures actively manage about 5% of all small private forestland
(woodlots less than 1,000 acres) in the province, and about 17% of all private
forestland within Group Venture service areas.3 The eighteen individual Group
Ventures vary greatly in the size of their membership, amount of land managed,
and level of wood production and government funded forest improvement
performed. These differences reflect local land ownership patterns, local resource
conditions, group goals, and organizational efficiency.
This thesis analyzes the conditions under which one particular Group
Venture, Conform, Inc., is created and maintains productive and successful
operations. Conform is chosen because it has the greatest independence from
government funding, and is one of the top producers and most active forest
managers. While these criteria may not be sole indicators of success, they
indicate an organizational health and vigor that is often difficult to induce in
collective management efforts, particularly those supported by the government.
Member characteristics, physical conditions, market conditions, and internal rules
and organization are analyzed to identify the factors most important to Conform's
success.
Research relied heavily upon interviews of key personnel in Conform, the
Department of Natural Resources, and several other individuals with particular
experience with Group Ventures (see Appendix II for a complete list). Most
interviews were performed in Halifax and the Musquodoboit Valley, Nova Scotia
over the period of March 9 to 18. Interviews were informal and varied in length
from one hour to about four hours. In addition to these interviews, written
sources on forestry in Nova Scotia and the Group Venture Program were used,
' Agfor 1991; Reed 1987.
including: meeting minutes, financial statements, and miscellaneous written
materials from Conform; government reports and newsletters; and academic
histories and analyses. These sources were supported by general forestry
literature addressing small woodlot owners, woodlot cooperatives, and related
forestry issues. These sources are combined to generate a history of the Group
Venture Program and the formation of Conform, and a description of Conform's
operations and organization.
In Chapter 2, 1 examine how government policy, the evolution of forest
industries, and changes in woodlot owner characteristics left the government with
a declining forest resource base, and a particularly difficult "woodlot owner
problem." Low prices for wood, due to a highly oligopolistic market, promoted
inactivity on many small private woodlots, or inclined many owners to take
marginal revenues from a growing rank of contractors. Forest conditions declined
as standard forest practices of clearcuts and selective removal of high quality trees
left the Province with "trash" forests with poor yields and few sawlogs.
Government activities promoted many of these problems by encouraging the
development of a few pulp mills through low-cost public land leases, diluting or
diverting market reform, and failing to regulate forest practices.
Declining resource conditions and declining management incentives
represented a potential downward spiral for Nova Scotia's forestry sector.
Without improved resource conditions, new productive capacity to improve
market conditions (and therefore management incentives) would not be created.
Reversing this situation, much the government's doing, necessitated government
intervention. With market reform facing stiff opposition from the forest industry,
a lack of funds for a new round of state land purchases, and lack of support for
forest practices regulation, the government had no alternative but to provide
direct incentives for improved forest practices. The decision to promote collective
management companies was based upon the potential for better efficiency in
distributing and coordinating use of forest improvement funds, better economic
efficiency through improved economies of scale, and more direct educational
channels.
In Chapter 3, I examine the history of one collective management
company, Conform, Ltd., considered one of the most successful in the Province.
Antecedents to collective forest management are considered in the Musquodoboit
Valley's economy, forest economy, and past organizing experiences. The events
surrounding Conform's formation, as well as its history of operations and
organizational change are next detailed. Conform was preceded by a history of
interest in woodlot owner issues, particularly the fairness of wood prices, and
other local organizing efforts. Despite some initial opposition by a local sawmill
owner and a number of surrounding communities, and problems with officials in
the Department of Lands and Forests, Conform formed with fifteen initial
members and goals of expanding to eventually own equipment and manage 30,000
acres of land. Conform quickly became one of the most productive Group
Ventures when measured by the amount of Forest Improvement work performed
and the volume of wood marketed. Acting on a business philosophy, Conform
shown organizational vigor and independence not common from forest collectives.
In Chapter 4, I analyze the conditions under which Conform is able to
successfully organize. This analysis considers the membership characteristics,
physical conditions, market conditions, and internal rules and organization in
identifying the factors most important to Conform's success. It was found that a
local organizational disposition and presence of skilled individuals, control of the
means of production, management on a profit-oriented business philosophy,
development of good internal decision-making processes, and a number of
particular management decisions were important factors in Conform's success.
CHAPTER 2 - The Group Venture Program
Wood production from small private woodlots is a persistent problem for
the forestry sector throughout North America.' In Nova Scotia, the large
dependence upon small woodlot owners for wood supply makes this problem
particularly acute. About 52% of woodlot acreage is in small ownerships (1000
acres or less), while 27% is government owned Crown land, and 21 % is large
private ownerships, primarily industrial.2 This ownership pattern, which has the
highest small woodlot concentration of all of the Canadian Provinces except
Prince Edward Island, emerged after generous land grants to political friends and
settlers left the most productive lands in private hands. This practice continued
into the 1920s, when the amount of private ownership was even larger than
present, before a large public repurchase program starting in the 1930s left the
present ownership pattern3 .
Production shares are somewhat lower for the small private owner, though
still significant: over 1983 to 1986, 43 % of wood production came from small
ownerships, 39% from large ownerships and 18% from Crown lands.' This
reliance places Nova Scotia's 30,000 small woodlot owners in an important
position in the Provincial forest policy decisions. However, despite this important
For the United States see Clawson 1979; Stoddard 1961; Task Force of Society of
American Foresters 1978; Sedjo, R.A. and D.M. Ostermeier 1977. For Canada see Blouin
1988; New Brunswick Private Woodlot Resources Study 1983.
2 Reed 1987:5.
Sandberg 1992:9-10.
4 Reed 1987:5.
status, economic conditions for woodlot owners are poor. Wood prices are the
lowest in North America, active woodlot management gives poor returns, price
and contractor information is poor, and efforts to organize collective marketing
have met with resistance.
To address long-run supply concerns the Province created the Group
Venture Program which promotes collective management of small woodlot to
improve economies of scale, disburse forest improvement funding, and increase
woodlot owner education. This chapter analyzes the conditions under which
government action came to support this program. The chapter starts by
describing the how the combination of government policies promoting an
unregulated and oligopolistic pulp industry, structural changes in the forest sector,
and changing social characteristics of woodlot owners led to a declining resource
base requiring substantial public assistance for its maintenance. To encourage
broad participation and efficient use of funds, collective management was
promoted as a mechanism for delivering forestry assistance. The options available
to public officials for delivering forestry assistance are described along with the
eventual Group Venture Program design. The history of woodlot owner
organizing is also recounted to show how this previous experience may have
contributed a large number of leaders interested in collective management and
increased woodlot owner understanding of organizing efforts and the source of
problems they face in woodlot management.
Forestry in Nova Scotia: Historical Antecedents to the Group Venture Program
Evolution of the Group Venture Program follows two connected paths in
the history of Nova Scotia's forests -- one path emerges from the changing forms
of production on the land while the other involves the changing role of
government in promoting the forest industry. Combined, these paths led to
continued degradation of the forest resource and declining levels and quality of
forest management. This decline necessitated government intervention in an
effort to avert long-term supply shortages.
Forest use and ownership changes in Nova Scotia are similar to those
experienced in other regions of Canada and the United States. Prior to the 1950s
and 60s, owners relied more upon woodlots for sustenance. Woodlot activity
represented a major form of income in rural areas without many opportunities --
for many, winter woodlot harvesting supplemented farming incomes. Woodlots
also produced wood fuel, lumber and fencing material for use on the farm.
Sawlogs, the primary forest product at the time, were harvested through high-
grading practices -- the better quality trees (both height, dimension and
straightness) were harvested, leaving the lower quality trees to grow. Over time,
tree sizes acceptable to end users continually diminished, leaving either over-aged,
low quality, or immature forests.' Pulp harvesting was somewhat limited, and
where it occurred, relied upon clearcutting methods.
During the late 1950s and 1960s, a number of changes to rural economies
and Nova Scotia's forestry sector changed the outlook of small private woodlots.
First, as alternative income opportunities grew and agricultural intensification was
' Baskerville and Regier 1986.
promoted, management and harvesting activity by woodlot owners diminished.
Employment shifts to more urban areas led to migration out of the rural
countryside. Intensification of agriculture led to larger farms, fewer farmers and
fewer jobs on the farm. The Province directly promoted intensification through
the Nova Scotia Farm Loan Board program in which farmlands are purchased by
the Province and leased to farmers with near or adjacent property until they can
be purchased outright. This program hoped to consolidate farmland ownership
into larger holdings to provide better economies of scale in agricultural
production. As this intensification increased, farmers' attention increasingly
focussed upon agriculture and not the woodlot. Many farmers also sold their
woodlots rather than continue forestry production. For the entire Province, farm
woodlot acreage declined from more than 1.8 million acres in 1951 to less than
1.4 million acres in 1961.6
Woodlot management became an increasingly uneconomical investment of
time or funds.' As will be shown, market conditions did not support adequate
wood prices to give woodlot owners reasonable returns upon their woodlots. As
self-management became uneconomical, owners increasingly turned to contractors
for sporadic management and harvesting activities.'
The second change was the addition of two large pulp and paper mills and
the continued decline in sawlog production, due to previous high-grading
6 Redpath 1974:20. Referencing Atlantic Development Board. Forestry in the Atlantic
Provinces. Background Study No. 1. Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1968.
7 See Dwyer 1974; Musquodoboit Valley Development Board [1964?]; Huber 1988.
8 Sandberg 1992:14.
practices, which shifted the market shares of the two products. Since the early
post-war peak, sawlog production has declined by one half, while pulpwood
production has increased nearly seven times.' In the late 1980s, about 80% of
wood produced was pulpwood."
Nova Scotia's government had taken aggressive steps to lure the Stora and
Scott pulp companies into Nova Scotia. The most prominent of the incentives
were long-term leases to Crown forestlands with very cheap stumpage rates.
These cheap Crown rates set such a low base for private stumpage values that
investment in forest management was impossible. With forests already degraded
from previous high-grading practices, pulpwood prices providing little incentive to
manage, and other income opportunities becoming more promising, land owned
by small woodlot owners became unmanaged and unused.
After about a decade of heavy harvesting for pulp wood (often on Crown
lands), concern began to arise about the future supply of wood to fuel Nova
Scotia's forest industry. Despite early warnings by the 1964 MacSween Royal
Commission, which had recognized that wood prices were so low that "the
producer, at best, could not do better than earn substandard wages with little or
nothing for stumpage or maintenance,"" little was done to remedy the situation.
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, three successive joint Federal-
9 Reed 1987:4.
1Department of Lands and Forests 1990:49.
" MacSween 1964.
Provincial Agriculture and Rural Development Acts (ARDA)12 provided minimal
funding for forest management on private lands. These early efforts were
predicated more upon rural development goals, than concerns about long-term
supply." This prioritization, however, was to change in coming years.
In the early 1970s, the spruce budworm infestation provided the acute
event that escalated government and forest industry concerns about woodlot
supply. The infestation affected 3.4 million acres (32% of Nova Scotia's forest
land) by 1980," and destroyed about 13 million cords of softwood." The
Province's initial policies stressed large private land purchases to insure that a
larger block of productive forest would be available for Crown leases. This policy
was not new to the Province who had been actively consolidating and increasing
public holdings since the 1930s. These Crown lands became the landbase that was
leased to the Stora and Scott companies during the 1960s to lure them to the
Province. 16 Federal interest in funding land purchases was limited, however.
Without Federal support for large land purchases, Provincial and Federal
negotiations focused upon funding for forestry assistance programs. When the
General Development Agreement of 1977 between the Province and the Federal
government was signed, it contained substantial funding for forestry assistance
12 Prior to 1966, known as the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act.
Clancy 1992.
" Johnson 1986:308.
Blouin 1988:8.
16 Sandberg 1992:9-10.
including incentives for management on Crown forests, industrial forests, and
small private forests. In addition to the Private Lands Program, serving non-
industrial owners, the agreement included the Group Venture Program which
would allow for incorporation of companies or cooperatives of landowners to
collectively manage forests and provide government funded forest services.
While supply concerns were driving the Federal and Provincial
governments toward the necessity of assisting forest management, ineffective
forest practices regulations further deteriorated operating conditions for private
woodlot owners. Legislation promoting good forestry practices has been relatively
unsuccessful in Nova Scotia. The first such attempt, the Small Tree Conservation
Act of 1942 provided some regulation of forest practices until it was replaced by
the less effective Forest Improvement Act in 1965. Setting diameter limits on
allowable harvesting, the Small Tree Act promoted the high-grading practices that
often left over-aged, rather than young trees. The Forest Improvement Act,
modelled on Swedish forestry regulation, relied upon regional forest practices
committees to develop forestry practice guidelines. These committees, however,
were unstable, unable to develop guidelines, and eventually replaced by a
Provincial body. The Act, in the words of former Department of Lands and
Forests official Ralph Johnson, "has neither proved popular nor workable in Nova
Scotia."" Some even contend that the primarily goal of the Act's passage was the
repeal of the Small Tree Conservation Act which provided some limitations to
expanding pulp wood harvesting that relied upon clear cutting of often less than
mature trees.
17 Johnson 1986:301.
The impact of limited forest practice regulation upon small woodlot owners
has been significant, as it has allowed unfettered increases in the mechanization
and scale of harvesting practices utilized by large contractors and mills. Increased
mechanization and scale lowers the harvesting costs of the large operators.
Because large mills can easily switch between supply sources, lowered
management costs on their own lands forces woodlot owners into ever declining
returns and pressure to use degrading harvesting practices. Most woodlot owners,
however, are unwilling to allow the type of harvesting and management performed
by the mills upon their lands, so they have often allowed their woodlots to fall out
of production.
The historical conditions leading to concern about future wood supply are
found in both the industrial development of forestry in Nova Scotia and
government policy toward the forestry sector. Government policies and decision
have clearly contributed to the need for major investments in forest management.
In many ways, the Nova Scotia government's actions promoted the poor
conditions for woodlot management and necessitated such a large public program.
Support of low wood prices, through cheap Crown leases and discouragement of
woodlot owner marketing efforts, have created a condition where small woodlot
owners have very little incentive to manage their woodlots. Through the repeal of
the Small Tree Act and the general failure to implement the Forest Improvement
Act, the Province also failed to provide standards for resource management that
could have sustained resources better. Baskerville, in describing conditions in
New Brunswick, contends that current resource problems arise because:
"Clearly it has been primarily the resource-based industries that have been
developed, secondarily the regional economy, and tertiarily the local
economies - but the resources have not been developed at all. The
resources have been characteristically run-down or ruined by resource
development.""
While it may appear that this problem arise because of the high percentage
of forest owned by small woodlot owners, experiences in other countries indicate
this condition does not always lead to supply problems, undermanagement, and a
need for government investment. In Sweden, for example, a combination of
highly regulated forest practices, strong forest product marketing boards, and
strong woodlot ownership associations has led to a situation where wood prices
are higher, management incentives are higher, and intensive management
occurs.' 9 In Nova Scotia, efforts by some within the government to adopt more
progressive legislation covering forest practices, market conditions, and Crown
leases have been consistently met by the pulp and paper company's ability to
garner political support at high levels. Economic blackmail and the threat of
pullout have been used successfully by the pulp mills in every political battle for
the past twenty-five years.
8 Baskerville and Regier 1986:82.
Sandberg 1988.
Evolution of Woodlot Owner Organization
As government agencies confronted the problems of long-term supply,
woodlot owners faced the changing forest economy with a different set of
concerns. With initial government support, woodlot owners organized in an effort
to improve economic conditions for woodlot management. Though efforts focused
upon marketing boards, development of leadership, organizational skills, and a
more knowledgeable woodlot owner populace may have contributed to the quick
formation of Group Ventures.
Though many woodlot owners turned to other occupations for income,
forestry still remained an important part of income for some owners. These
owners faced several problems in maintaining forestry incomes: static prices for
wood products, unreliable and limited markets for wood products, declining forest
conditions, and less competitive management technologies compared with
increasingly mechanized contractors. The worst of these were "disorganized"
marketing conditions because "the pulp wood producer was completely at the
mercy of the shipper of the pulpwood. "20 The effect of these problems was to
squeeze the woodlot owner into a position of increasingly marginal production.
Efforts to address these problems are difficult since woodlot owners are
many and dispersed. Marketing Boards regulated a number of agricultural
products (milk, hogs and wool)" under the Natural Products Marketing Act,
20 Clancy 1992:34. Quoting: Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on Provincial Development
and Rehabilitation. Report on Forest Industries. Halifax, N.S. 1944.
21 Contract Agreement 1966:Appendix B, p. 2.
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though attempts to include forest products in the early 1960s, after the large land
lease to Stora greatly increased market oligopoly, were unsuccessful." To mollify
woodlot owner concerns, the Province in 1964 convened a Royal Commission to
study the problem. Lack of woodlot owner organization was targeted as a major
problem by the Commission:
"...the root cause of most of the problems of pulpwood production is lack
of organization. This handicap leaves them in a position where they are
not able to do very much to improve their economic standing or to
participate effectively in programs which may be designed from time to
time by government and other for their benefit. ... The involvement of
these producers in any systematic program of forestry development
including utilization and conservation is utterly impracticable except on an
organized basis."2
Rather than develop marketing boards, however, the Province supported an
ARDA program to provide organizational and educational assistance to woodlot
owners through the Extension Department of Saint Francis Xavier University in
Antigonish. Though the goals were broad, priority upon marketing problems was
clearly expressed by the Extension Department: "...the need for improved prices
for wood products is of immediate concern to the woodlot owner presently while
the need for woodlot consolidation, management and conservation is not so
22 Clancy 1992.
23 MacSween 1964:28.
immediately felt.""
This project resulted in the formation of 18 county associations and,
eventually in 1969, the Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners Association, which acted as
an umbrella organization. Though the Association concerned itself with a broad
set of issues, the organization's efforts focused upon development of a marketing
board for pulpwood. In 1970, NSWOA presented a formal marketing proposal to
the Nova Scotia Marketing Board, which regulated the individual product
marketing boards, beginning a two-year deliberation that polarized woodlot
owners and mill operators. It is not possible here to detail the history of this
policy process, though this history had a clear impact upon the eventual form of
legislation and future of efforts to formalize the marketing structure.
The Pulpwood Marketing Act of 1972 allowed for the formation of
exclusive bargaining agents to negotiate with pulp mills over prices and quotas.26
Though it lacked the teeth of a strong marketing act (for example, binding
arbitration was not included), the Act changed the marketing relations for
pulpwood because "henceforth, the contending interests in the pulpwood market
would have to work within this framework. 2' Changes would be slow in coming,
24 Contract Agreement 1966:2-3.
2' Those interested should refer to Clancy.
26 A quota is an annual agreement between a mill and wood producer (woodlot owner
or contractor) for the delivery of a fixed quantity of wood, often on a regular schedule.
Traditionally these were negotiated individually between the mill and the contractor or
woodlot owner.
27 Clancy 1992:154.
however. Attempts by the NSWOA to gain bargaining agent status were rejected
in 1974 and 1975 due to a combination of opposition from the pulp mills,
procedural difficulties by the Pulpwood Marketing Board, and ambiguity over
what constituted the majority representation necessary to attain bargaining agent
status.
These failures led to a change in NSWOA's constitution that diluted its
power as a representative of woodlot owners. In 1979, membership expanded to
include "operators", such as contractors or sawmills operators, to fit the Pulpwood
Marketing Board's new producer definition which interpreted production as
preparation for sale, rather than owners of wood on the stump (production being
the act of harvesting, not the growing of trees). This membership expansion was
therefore necessary for the NSWOA to gain the majority it needed to become a
bargaining agent. Though the new NSWOOA (Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners and
Operators Association) could now further the development of marketing boards,
woodlot owner representation had become diluted and marketing conditions now
favored the seller of wood (i.e. contractors) and not owners of wood on the
stump.
NSWOOA successfully became bargaining agents for the districts around
Stora (1979) and Scott (1982) and agreements were reached with both companies.
In both cases, several subsequent agreements have been made. Prices have
increased substantially over the period of agreements (from about $26 per cord in
1979 to $45 per cord in 1988), though this growth is roughly comparable to growth
in end product prices.28 Since wood prices before the marketing agreements did
not keep pace with end product prices," one might conclude that marketing
boards have improved market conditions and promoted fairer wood prices. Prices
in Nova Scotia, however, are still significantly less than regional prices,
particularly those of neighboring New Brunswick (who has until recently had a
more strict marketing structure) where prices are $10 to $15 dollars greater per
cord.30 Many observers have concluded that the marketing structure has been
only partially effective at providing fair prices for producers and woodlot
owners." A marketing district has never been established for the Bowater mill,
though its prices are comparable if not higher than those of Scott or Stora.
Though woodlot owners benefit from increases in wood prices, since the
changes in 1979, the NSWOOA has been less of an advocate for woodlot owners.
It has subsequently undergone organizational difficulties: a split off by the Stora
marketing district, and a dilution of membership. Many of these problems may
stem from the multiple interests within the Association and its inability to develop
a core of goals. Coincidentally, this is the period in which the Group Venture
movement arose. While the political role of the Group Ventures has tended not
to be significant, it has begun to supplant the NSWOOA as the main
representative of woodlot owners. Political involvement increased with the
28 Reed 1987:41.
29 Reed 1987:41.
3 Reed 1987:39-40.
* Reed 1987; Curtis 1988; Curtis 1987; Clancy 1992.
32 Another significant factor was wood quota and allocation restrictions that left many
producers with inadequate quotas in the marketing district (NSWOOA-SSD 1984).
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formation of a centralizing Group Venture organization in 1987. Members of
group ventures have also played a significant role in NSWOOA activities,
including Presidency and inclusion in the negotiating teams.
This history indicates that small woodlot owners in Nova Scotia are aware
of the need for collective organizing and capable of such organization with
minimal assistance. The dilution, and subsequent fractionalization, of the
NSWOA was largely a result of changes in government policies regulating wood
marketing, rather than a clear sign of woodlot owner incapacity to organize. The
history also indicates that the primary issue of concern for woodlot owners is
wood price and the marketing structure for wood sales.
The Group Venture Program
At the time of the Group Venture Program's initiation, the problem of
stimulating productivity from small private woodlots was new to forest policy
makers. Efforts had continually been confounded, however, as an understanding
of the changing woodlot owner interests was only just emerging. Increasingly,
small woodlot owners are more likely to own land for amenity or investment than
for production. Surveys consistently indicate that wood production is a less
important reason for owning forestland than fuelwood use, inclusion in residence
or farm holding, investment, or personal satisfaction.33 In a 1981 survey of Nova
" Birch 1988; Birch 1986; Birch and Widmann 1987; MacQuarrie 1981; SWOAM 1991.
On average, those that manage for timber production have large woodlots than those who
do not.
24
Scotia private woodland owners, MacQuarrie found that timber production ranked
fourth behind inclusion in permanent home, inclusion in farm, and fuelwood as
the "main reason for owning" forest property." Only 28% had sold wood
products over the past two years and 40% undertook no woodlot activity at all
over the previous five years. The problem that has confounded extension
foresters and economists attempting to promote woodlot production is that
woodlot owners do not act like classical rational economic actors. Programs
intended to give adequate incentives to promote management activity often fail
because woodlot owners have other interests in woodlot ownership or woodlots
are too low a priority among other activities."
Policy recommendations have included appropriate tax policies, improved
market information, extension services, owner education, and management
assistance. Among these policies is the direct delivery of forestry assistance to
non-industrial forest owners. At the time, many potential mechanisms existed for
providing assistance. The Private Forest program serving individual owners had
been operating for many years and a continuation of this program could have
been seen as adequate. The most prevalent forms of government forestry
assistance programs operate solely on an individual basis, including all Canadian
provinces (with the exception of Nova Scotia and Quebec) and the Northern New
England States of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont. In most cases, these
programs follow the same model: a management plan (of varied detail) is
developed with partial assistance, and management is undertaken with partial
* MacQuarrie 1981.
Boyd 1984.
assistance available for selective silviculture practices and, in some cases, services
such as road building. Programs differ on mandatory terms of management,
requirements that plans be carried out, and stipulations on assistance.36
In Nova Scotia, initial forestry assistance efforts under ARDA led to the
development of the Private Lands Program in 1973 which provided direct
assistance to individual woodlot owners. As this program encountered difficulties,
officials within Department of Forests and Lands began to look at collective
management in Quebec and Sweden as models for increasing woodlot
management by small owners. After a number of exploratory trips to study these
programs, a pilot project was started in West Pictau in 1975 to test the collective
forest management concept in Nova Scotia. Initial success and interest by Federal
officials led to the inclusion of the Group Venture Program in the
Federal/Provincial General Development Agreement. The program's success has
led to continued funding under the three subsequent joint federal/provincial
agreements and the Group Venture Program is partially funded through more
permanent provincial legislation (see the list below.) Each agreement has
provided increased levels of funding to allow additional Groups to operate: eight
groups were funded under the first agreement, another ten under the following
agreement.
36 Griffiths Mueke Associates 1989.
Figure 1
Group Venture Program Chronology
1975 West Pictau Pilot
1977 General Development Agreement (GDA) 1977-82
1979 By Spring, 8 Groups have signed agreements with Province.
1982 Forest Resource Development Agreement (FRDA) 1982-89
1984 Six more Groups begin operations.
1985 Two more Groups begin operation.
1987 The final two Groups begin operations.
1989 Cooperation Agreement for Forestry Development (CAFD) 1989-91
1992 Cooperation Agreement for Forestry Development (CAFD) 1991-95
A Group Venture is a company or cooperative that collectively manages its
members woodlots. Collective management provides a number of benefits to the
government: more efficient usage of government funding through blocking of
multiple parcels and economies of scale in operations; increased administrative
efficiency; more reliable follow through on management plans; and more direct
service and education. Government funding for operations costs (three staff and
office costs) and forest improvement work is the most significant government
incentive for Group organization.
The Program is administered by the Department of Natural Resources
(formerly the Department of Lands and Forests) who approves funding and
oversees Group Venture operations. The Group Ventures are then responsible
for developing management plans on member woodlots and performing approved
forest improvement activities, which include building or improving forest access
roads and fire ponds, boundary improvements, and silviculture treatments." The
original concept called for Group Ventures to become viable businesses that are
independent of Operations funding from the government." Forest Improvement
funding would continue, however, for the next 20 to 30 years until the Group's
role as "trash collectors" -- i.e. harvesters of degraded forests -- for the forestry
sector has been completed.39
Group Ventures provide full-service management for their members:
obtaining forestry assistance funds, developing management plans, insuring
silviculture work is performed, marketing member's wood, and educating of
members. Some early declarations included other goals such as ownership of
harvesting equipment and the development of milling facilities. To receive
funding under the Group Venture Program, organizations must agree to a number
of responsibilities: '
3 Allowable silviculture work must follow government standards and generally includes
most activities except harvesting.
* Agfor 1991:16-7; Group Management Viability Study 1982.
3 Blouin 1988:9. There have been some discussion of obtaining management funding
through the marketing agreements with the pulp mills. This practice has been used in other
regions where forestry assistance is less available, such as the southern United States.
0 Greater detail of Group Venture operations is available in the Conform case study in
Chapter 3.
" Hundert 1987:19.
- Enter into a forest management and marketing agreement with
shareholders;
- Develop management plans to proscribe road, fire pond and boundary
improvements, and needed silviculture work;
- Implement management plans;
- Collect 5% commission on all marketed forest products from managed
lands to offset operations costs.
Through consolidation of multiple small woodlots under single
management, government officials hoped to stimulate management and harvesting
from private forest owners. Group Ventures were seen to deliver many particular
benefits toward this goal:
- A more efficient delivery mechanism for forestry improvement assistance
than a Private Lands program using Department of Lands and Forest's
foresters and administration.
- Better follow through with management activities after the development of
a management plan.
- Blocking of adjacent woodlots under single management to improve the
management economies of scale. Benefits could be accrued from
minimizing road building, batching management activities, and coordinating
wildlife and non-timber management.
Improved service quality, reliability and access for all range of silviculture
treatments. Problems often exist in individual programs where contractors
have little incentive to keep to management and quality standards, or
perform jobs with marginal economic benefits.
Improved management conditions created by the larger volumes of wood
handled by Groups and the manager's ability to devote time to market
development provide potential advantages in price, market access, and
market quotas. Landowners also reduce their risk of being cheated by
contractors who underprice or do not report entire loads.
Full-service woodlot management for those with little interest, inadequate
knowledge, or too little time to manage their woodlots. Absentee
landlords could also be provided with a means of managing their woodlots.
More direct and personal landowner education through interaction with
Group Venture foresters who generally have more time and interest in
educating landowners than contractors. In addition, many Group Ventures
sponsor field days, or show landowners other woodlots under management
as a part of educational benefits.
Despite these potential benefits, programs attempting to promote the
formation of collective enterprises are often unable to create broad and stable
action. Barriers to the success of the Group Venture Program might arise
because of difficulties with the formation and sustenance of the Groups, or
conflicts within the Groups or between Groups and program administrators.
Potential problems include inadequate incentives, mis-match of program goals
with local goals, mistrust of organizing efforts, improper organizational structures,
appropriation of benefits by local elites or cliques, and past bad experiences with
organizing or government programs. While some of these problems arose, initial
interest in the program by communities was tremendous. The first GDA
agreement called for eight Group Ventures to be formed over the period of 1977
to 1982, but within several months, applications for eight new Group Ventures
had been received and agreements were signed for all Groups by Spring of 1979.
Conclusion
Group Ventures, with their own independent association and partial
funding secured through provincial legislation, have a achieved relatively strong
and permanent status in Nova Scotia. The Group Venture Program has grown
from a total of eight Group Ventures, about 50,000 acres under management, and
about 300 management plans in 1980, to 18 Group Ventures, about 286,500 acres
under management, and about 2,250 management plans in 1990.4 Despite this
growth, Group Ventures still manage only about 5% of all private forests and only
about 17% of private forests within their designated service areas.
42 Department of Lands and Forests 1980,1990.
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It is debatable whether this level of woodlot participation and management
adequately meets the province's goal of increasing woodlot productivity. These
modest gains have also been achieved at a relatively high price ($6.5 million
Canadian in 1989-90, and about $36.5 million Canadian over the program's
history), prompting criticism that the program is a poor use of public funds. The
program's impact on small woodlot owners themselves has been mixed. While
management ease for many is facilitated by Group Ventures, and economic
conditions are somewhat improved, Group Ventures have not been able to
address the fundamental market and price problems which are at the root of
woodlot owner and management problems. These impacts will become more
evident in Chapter 3 which describes the formation of and operations of Conform.
The need for government action to increase long-run supply was created by
a combination of inactive management on small woodlots, poor management and
renewal practices, and the crisis of the Spruce Bud Worm infestation. These
problems were partially the result of changes in the structure of the forest
industry, such as the growth of pulp markets, growth of contractors, and the
changing desires of small woodlot owners, and government policy, such as failed
forest practices legislation, large forest leases to pulp companies, and unstable
marketing structures. The high percentage of woodlots owned by small private
owners necessitated a policy by the government to increase productivity from
these forests. Of the many options available, collective management was tried
first as an experiment and subsequently as a full-scale program after some initial
successes.
Though government support has generally been strong, many DLF officials
have been unsupportive and outright opposition has been expressed by people
questioning the prudence of large expenditures on Group Ventures, and Forest
Assistance in general. This thesis can only speculate on the impact of this
opposition upon the rules and administration of Group Ventures, particularly with
regard to the discretion and flexibility of funding.
CHAPTER 3 - Case Study of Conform, Inc.
The previous chapter dealt primarily with programmatic issues in
promoting collective forest management amongst small woodlot owners in Nova
Scotia. In this chapter, Conform, Inc. is examined to determine the conditions
and factors leading to a specific case of successful collective forest management.
Conform is studied because it represents a potentially promising models of
collective forest management. Success is defined in terms of the organization's
ability to maintain activity. Indicators of success include: independence from
external funding; ability to insure access of services to members; ability to attract
and support new members; and consistent performance in implementing forest
management and marketing.
First, I present a brief social and physical history of forestry in the
Musquodoboit Valley. This history examines some of the pre-existing conditions
that led to eventual success of collective management. Events surrounding the
Conform's initial formation and the initial development of group objectives are
described next. Finally, the operations, organization and philosophy of Conform
that allow it to one of the most productive Group Ventures are described. Within
this description are many group and management decisions which led Conform
down a more organizationally sustainable path.
Social and Forestry History of Musquodoboit Valley
The Musquodoboit Valley is situated about 50 miles north-east of Halifax
in a valley formed by the Musquodoboit River running about 20 to 25 miles
northeast-by-southwest (see map on following page). The Valley is relatively
isolated despite its close proximity to Halifax.' Access to the region is entirely via
secondary roads. Population of the Valley in 1966 was about 4,500 across about
12 towns and hamlets, and has declined slightly since. Towns in the regions are
small. Middle Musquodoboit, the largest, has a gas station, an agricultural co-op,
a drug store, two restaurants, and a hospital.
Agriculture, forestry and limestone quarrying are the mainstays of the local
economy. The economics of these industries have been adversely affected by
changing technologies, the result being a declining contribution of resource
activities (agriculture and forestry) to income. Land owners with five or more
acres received only 25% of their income from resource activities, while those for
whom farming was the major source of income (only about 200 people) received
only 60% of income from resource activities.2 The valley floor is mostly farmland
where hay and pasture for beef and dairy cattle is the most common crop. In
1969, 48% of farm income came from milk sales, 18% from cattle sales, and 12%
from hog sales.3  Income through secondary production (sawmills and produce
transportation) is significant. The remainder of the region's income is earned
through "off-farm" income, including services, professional, and transfer payments.
1 Redpath 1974:1, and other interviewees.
2 Redpath 1974:38.
3 Redpath 1974:12.
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A small proportion (about 9% in 1969)4 commute to the urban areas of
Dartmouth-Halifax or Truro. Despite numerous plans and efforts, tourism has
never been significant in the Valley.'
The Valley sides are mostly forested and often connected in ownership to
the farmlands on the valley floor. The result is "a pastoral landscape which
reflects nearly two centuries of settlement." 6 An estimated 80% of the
Musquodoboit watershed's 176,000 acres is forested.7 As of 1969, over 60% of
forestland was owned by small woodlot owners, over 20% by industrial owners,
and about 15% by the Crown.' A 1982 study indicates few significant changes: 9
54% of the region was owned by small woodlot ownerships, 24% by large
companies, 6% by the Crown, and 16% was classified as "other lands". Land
tenure tends to be very stable. Of land owners, about 45% had resided in the
Valley for longer than 50 years, while only 10% percent had resided for less than
20 years. Further, 75% indicated no interest in selling property. 0 Over time,
however, rural to urban migration has somewhat reduced the Valley's population.
4 Redpath 1974:21. Referencing Connor, D.M. and D.W. Magill. The Role of Education
in Rural Development. ARDA Research Report No. RE-1. Ottawa: Queen's Printer for
Canada, 1965.
' MRDB [1964?]; MRDB [1968?].
6 Redpath 1974:2.
* Redpath 1974:20.
8 Redpath 1974:20. Referencing Conner, J. Musquodoboit River Valley Study: Socio
Economic Report. No. 15. Wolfville, N.S.: Acadia University Institute, 1964.
9 Group Management Viability Study 1982:22. Area defined as Conform's initial service
area.
10 Redpath 1974:14.
Characterization of the region's people is difficult. General impressions
based upon interviews indicate that the Valley has a strong work ethic in
agriculture and forestry that has made it a productive agricultural region in the
past. This approach is one that sees land as productive assets. This success is
somewhat in contrast to the rest of Nova Scotia, which has the reputation,
warranted or not, of being less industrious. These impressions, which are very
subjective, may be affected by the nature of this study and should be treated as
such.
Forestry is one of the traditional occupations in the primarily agricultural
region. Farmers often cut wood during the winter when crops cannot be grown.
Reliance upon the forest began to diminish, however, due to a number of factors.
First, the flight of many landowners to more urban areas left many lands without
local owners. Few of these owners continued to produce on their woodlots,
though many sold their land. The 1969 survey of landowners showed that about
21 % of owners (and 15% of the acreage) were non-residents of the valley.1" The
second trend was the declining returns to forestry. While there had been little
economic analysis of the small land owners production decisions,12 most farmers
and foresters realized that returns on their efforts in the forests were marginal,
and certainly not worth the investments in equipment, management or roads. In
1969, income from forestry accounted for only 7% (or, $62,000) of gross income
" Redpath 1974:21.
12 The MacSween Commission, which relied heavily upon price data collected in
Musquodoboit Valley, stands out as a notable exception.
from resource activities (forestry and agriculture). Large farms produced little
from their woodlots, though non-farmers" actually received from 54% to 69% of
their resource activity income from woodlots. Most forestry income (72%) came
from small farmers and upper income non-farmers."
The last trend was the increasing intensification of production on farmlands
which diverted attention from forests. The Nova Scotia Farm Loan Board
program, promoting consolidation of farmland ownership into larger holdings, had
twenty-seven participating farmers (about 10,000 acres) in the Valley by 1969."
As farms consolidated, increased attention was required by farmers to their
growing businesses, which gave less time for the declining forestry venture.
Though Musquodoboit Valley forestry community seems to share many
characteristics with the rest of the province, in a number of ways it is distinct.
First, a higher than average number of people seem to rely upon woodlots for
income or did in the past 6 , though there is no data to confirm this point. In a
1969 survey of landowners, 39% indicated that they regarded woodlots as "a
source of regular or occasional income."" Second, forestry seemed to be
proceeding on a somewhat technologically "backward" pace. During the 1960s
when power saw use became widespread, local woodsmen often continued to use
Farming not the major income source.
Redpath 1974:11.
Redpath 1974:8.
16 This impression gained primarily through discussions with people familiar with the
region.
17 Redpath 1974:21.
simple bucksaws. This partially reflected a growing split between contractors --
generally working for pulp mills -- who were able to invest in the new equipment,
and woodlot owners who did not have large enough lots to warrant such
investments. The result, as one local put it, was that woodlot owners either "did
something else or they did forestry the old way."
Before Conform, forestry and the forests in Musquodoboit Valley were
very different than they are today:
- Before the growth of the pulp industry, forest practices relied upon high-
grading, or selective cutting,'" of good trees for sawmills. Over reliance
upon this practice has resulted in "trash" forests with species or tree quality
that cannot be used by the sawmill industry."
- Though not significant in earlier times, clear cutting became the
predominant practice with the growth of the pulp industry in the 1960s.
The scale of this practice, requiring heavy equipment, has contributed to
the growth of contractors as woodlot owners became increasingly unable to
afford machinery investments. The effect on the forest resource has been
highly degrading particularly when areas cut are very large, with numerous
18 High-grading, or selective cutting, is the practice of cutting the high quality trees and
leaving the remainder to regenerate. High-grading can produce excellent un-even aged
forests if performed properly, or degraded forests with poor quality, over-aged and
genetically inferior trees, is performed improperly.
'9 See Thurston 1983. In this article, Murray Prest, a long-time regional resident, sawmill
owner and forest practices advocate, contends that some, he in particular, selective cut to
promote the growth of higher value red spruce.
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problems stemming from even-aged management (e.g. herbicidal spraying),
and soil and sapling damage from heavy equipment.
Little management, particularly silviculture, occurred because it was not
economically feasible. The mills gave little incentive to manage well, and
even discouraged good management through poor practices on their own or
Crown land.
Interior land became increasingly inaccessible because of lack of roads and
the decline of markets. This land was essentially unmanaged, which given
the past high-grading practices, often resulted in unhealthy forests.
Access to markets was very limited. Those with large woodlots and regular
annual harvests could obtain quotas with the mills. Without a regular
harvest, however, selling wood was much more difficult. The only real
option was to sell through the pulp mill representative at whatever price he
was willing to pay. Some would harvest before obtaining an agreement
which left them at the mercy of the mills. Many sawmills did their own
harvesting on their own or leased woodlots, making sawlog markets
difficult to penetrate.
A lot of wood was cut by landowners during the winter to supplement
income. Many owned their own equipment, though much of it was not
used to full capacity.
Woodland was of little value. For example, in the 1960's, one 600 acre lot
sold for only $1,200. Both the lack of access to markets and the inability
to access much of the timber reduced land values.
Resource Condition
Nova Scotia's forests are classified within the Acadia Forest Region with a
mixture of northern coniferous species with some hardwoods.2" As classified by
the Department of Development, Conform's region is a combination of Sugar
Maple-Yellow Birch-Fir Zone and Red Spruce-Hemlock-Pine Zone." Regional
forests are classified as about 76% merchantable, 10% immature or regenerating,
and 13 % low density. Of the merchantable regions, about 60% is softwoods, 13 %
is hardwoods, and 26% is in mixed stands.22
Over time, resource quality declined from a productive standpoint with
little sawlog potential, and increasingly overaged and overstocked forests. Almost
all forests within the region have been cut over at some point in history, most
several times." Many lots are overmature, with trees of low quality species (such
as firs) or with small dimension, poor straightness, and many imperfection.
Overcrowding, due to lack of management, also results in diminished growth and
lower quality trees. Forest inventories during the 1960s revealed that:
20 Goldsmith 1980:85.
2' Goldsmith 1980:84.
22 Conform 1977a. The region considered is a 150,000 acres and is not the initial service
area (it may be Conform's proposed service area).
23 Forestry has been practiced for about 350 years on Nova Scotia (Goldsmith 1980).
"volume per acre yields in age classes over 60 years were less than
expected, due primarily to cutting, and to a lesser degree, mortality due to
age, low densities on poor sites, and lack of management in establishing
new sites. The softwood trees remaining in the older age classes (over 60
years) are primarily suited for the chemical pulpwood market, with a
limited potential for sawlogs." 24
Many factors contributed to this forest decline: increased non-management and
neglect by woodlot owners, poor economic incentives to manage, and past high-
grading and current clear cutting practices.
The spruce budworm did not impact the Musquodoboit Valley the way it
ravaged Cape Breton and, to a lesser degree, North Central Nova Scotia. Other
regions of Nova Scotia, however, have more optimal conditions -- western Nova
Scotia, in particular, has excellent resource conditions that have prompted
consideration and merit of the development of a new mill."2 Statistics of the
eight Group Ventures indicate that Conform had either the highest or second
highest average merchantable wood volume per acre each of the first four years.26
While this may indicate that Conform's region has the best resource conditions, it
may also indicate that Conform is more successful at attracting owners of better
quality lots to the company, or be a result of measurement biases.
24 Redpath 1974:20.
25 Sandberg 1988:16.
26 Nova Scotia Department of Lands and Forests 1980-83.
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Previous Organizing Efforts in Musquodoboit Valley
The Musquodoboit Valley has had a number of previous experiences with
community organizing efforts. The implementation of the joint federal/provincial
program ARDA prompted the formation of a local development group, the
Musquodoboit Rural Development Board (MRDB). The MRDB's agenda under
ARDA was broad economic development, with committees addressing agriculture,
business and industry, tourism, human resources, education, churches, recreation,
fisheries, and forestry. Early forestry efforts were focussed upon obtaining better
pulp wood prices which were necessary to making forestry practice a viable
business enterprise.2" According to calculations and a survey of local woodlot
owners by the Forestry Committee of the MRDB, current wood prices made
forestry a marginal, if not losing, enterprise.28
As a part of efforts to obtain better wood prices, the Forestry Committee
advocated organization of member of the forestry sector, including woodlot
owners, contractors, and workers in forest products production. There is "no co-
ordinating point for shipping or any other forest activity. The forest producer and
small woodlot owner is totally an individual, sometimes thought to be at the
mercy of very large and well organized business concerns. t 1 9 The Committee also
pointed to the need for maintaining the quality of forest management to improve
the returns to forest owners. When Conform formed fifteen years later, these
27 MRDB [1964?].
21 MRDB [1964?]:27-35. This information was among the only factual information
available for the MacSween Commission in 1964.
29 MRDB [1964?]:33.
issues were still the core concerns of small woodlot owners.
While other Committees in the MRDB were, in general, more successful in
generating action than the Forestry Committee, this must partially be attributed to
the lack of funds available for forestry work. What little money was available
targeted forest management work, and not the marketing issues that locals were
most concerned about. Activity in the Halifax County Woodlot Owners, the
county level arm of the NSWOA, seemed to be limited. Though NSWOA efforts
focussed on marketing, the locus of its activities seemed to be in Eastern Nova
Scotia, in the region of Saint Xavier's University.
During this period, one of DLF's few extension foresters was stationed in
Musquodoboit Harbor south of the valley. This extension forester met frequently
with a number of the foresters in the Valley to discuss a range of forestry issues,
though the clearest concern at that time was price. The people involved in these
informal discussions were among the members of the initial group that formed
Conform. Between these two organizing forces, the MRDA and extension
forestry, early discussions of the problems of small woodlot owners raised the
issue of organization though none actually came to fruition. One of the barriers
was lack of a structure or avenue in which to implement collective marketing.
"They might have been interested in it, " said this forester, "but they didn't know
how to do it and neither did I." These efforts do, however, show a previous
interest in woodlot owner issues and an effort to develop organizations that seems
to have promoted the quick development of the Conform initiative.
Numerous efforts aside from forestry had also been undertaken. The most
significant of these was a half million dollar flood control project funded by
ARDA through the MRDB. MRDB also undertook other initiatives in health
care, recreation, agriculture, business development, and human resources."
Cooperatives within the region included an agricultural purchasing coop, a
blueberry co-op, and a fuel oil purchasing co-op out of Truro. Thus, there was an
organizational predisposition to collective management once the idea became
known.
Formation of Conform
As news of the West Pictau pilot project spread and it became known that
the next General Development Agreement might include funding for more Group
Ventures, interest grew amongst woodlot owners in other parts of the Province.
The West Pictau pilot showed both woodlot owners and administrators that wide
spread implementation of Group Ventures was potentially viable. Locally and
within Lands and Forests, people began communications to promote a next round
of Group Ventures to arise from next joint federal/provincial agreement.
The first meetings to discuss potential for a local Group Venture in the
Musquodoboit Valley began in March of 1977. Though the General Development
Agreement would not be signed until June 1977, it was clear by this time that
funding would be included for more Group Ventures. After meetings with the
existing pilot project operators in West Pictau and government officials, a general
30 MRDB [1964?]; MRDB [1968?].
meeting for those interested in the Group Venture was held on July 25, 1977,
where an informal agreement was made to create Conform." The group drafted
a set of five objectives that remained unchanged for several years, including:
"1. To organize 75 to 100 forest land owners into a management unit to
collectively operate and harvest their forest resources.
2. To consolidate the forest land of the members of Conform into a
management unit large enough to support harvesting and processing equipment
on a sustained yield basis. A total of 25 to 30 thousand acres would be an
objective of Conform.
3. To provide a market for members of Conform for standing or harvested
timber.
4. To establish and operate a sawmill and dressing mill to manufacture and
market forest products.
5. To provide an organization through which the shareholders of Conform
Ltd. may take advantage of silviculture assistance programs as outlined in the
G.D.A. agreement."32
A Steering Committee was formed to carry out the development of
" Conform 1978d. Conform is an acronym for Consolidated Forest Owners Resource
Management.
32 Conform 1977a.
organizational plans and arrangements, particularly the interactions with the
government program. By September, fifteen people had given their firm
commitment to formation of a company. This support was necessary to meet the
requirements of a minimum of ten people to form a Group Venture. By October
17, Conform's proposal had been accepted for presentation to the Project
Committee within the Division of Lands and Forests. In addition, verbal approval
was given for Conform to incorporate as a company.
External and Local Differences
While the initial response was quick, by December attitudes had changed
and there was concern that "we were making little progress with the government
and in a number of cases they had not kept their word so we would have to take
more drastic steps to get Conform Ltd. off the ground."" In subsequent months
Conform would encounter difficulties with government officials on several issues,
including the landowner's agreement and service area size. These disagreements
reflected differences in how to best encourage woodlot owner membership and
what region size Conform could adequately service.
Several particular points were debated. First, there was debate as to
whether individual woodlot owners already receiving forestry assistance through
the individual Private Lands Program would be forced to place those lots under
management of the Group Venture if they were within its service area. Conform
" Conform 1978c:No. 6.
argued that such requirements precluded the ability of individuals to operate on
their own and might lead to potential tensions of shareholders not wanting to be a
part of the company.34 While the first General Agreement (1977-82) included
this provision, the subsequent agreement allowed woodlot owners within a Group
Venture service area to join the individual Private Lands Program.
A second issue was the size of commission for all wood sold off managed
lots. Conform wanted a lower commission (2% of the roadside price versus the
government's recommendation of 5%) to discourage lot owners from placing only
immature lots under management, and keeping mature, near-harvest lots out of
the company. They also objected to the payment of commission on Christmas
trees which were an especially valuable product." While the difference between
5% and 2% may not have a significant effect upon roadside prices, it does greatly
affect stumpage prices to the landowner which are the roadside prices less the
costs of harvesting. In some cases, the 5% commission could be as high as 25%
of the actual stumpage fee to land owners.36 The concern with the commission,
and a few other stipulations, was that landowners would be unwilling to sign
agreements with Conform.
A third issue was the size of the service area. The service area is the
region in which Conform is allowed to manage woodlots. Conform initially
applied for a service area which government officials thought was too large for
4 Conform 1978b.
* Conform 1978b.
36 Hundert et al. 1988:9; "Summary of information from the six Central Region Group
Ventures".
Conform to service, too costly to service from one site, and departed from the
focus of consolidating adjacent properties under single management. Conform
felt that the service area should not be used to limit the group's activities, and
that the regional DLF foresters administering the private programs often had
areas twice the size of Conform's submission.37
These issues affected the whole Group Venture program, as well as
Conform, since standard agreements had to be developed for all of the individual
Group Ventures. Conform's then-president described these disputes as a
negotiation in which the initial positions were taken to establish bargaining
leverage. This was a negotiation where the Group Ventures had little leverage
and basically had to accept the DLF's terms. Eventually, Conform agreed to the
5% commission and the reduced service area, though no commission was to be
paid on Christmas tree sales. This outcome seems important because it shows
that the Group Ventures had little input into the development of what was, in
some cases, their businesses. This lack of input into Program decision-making has
been reiterated throughout the Program's history, and, combined with the
uncertainty of future funding, has made Conform wonder whether they would be
better without government funding.38
While these issues may appear to be relatively technical decisions, they
seemed to reflect an adversarial relationship between local Group Ventures and
Lands and Resources officials. Reports of public meetings indicate that
Conform 1978b.
38 Redden 1991.
government officials were held in great suspicion and the unnegotiable positions
of these issues were seen as ways of controlling the Group Ventures.39 These
relations varied with individuals in DLF and reflected the internal split described
earlier between "social" and "industrial" foresters.
Another difference, though not quite as explicit, was the degree to which
business-like behavior and profit-seeking was acceptable by program
administrators. While program officials and early reports explicitly state that
producing "viable" and "self-sustaining" organizations is a goal of the program,
people within Conform seemed to feel that administrators really desired the
Groups to operate like "arms of government'. Early Conform reports indicate
that "it is also government policy that they always keep complete control of these
companies but this is not what we are proposing. "" Further, there was concern
"that all our objects of the company might not be correct to work under the
G.D.A. Agreement."'" Many of Conform's efforts to develop a self-sustaining
business had not been generally encouraged. The Department of Lands and
Forests, for example, discouraged Conform's equipment purchase. Group
Ventures have never been allowed to profit from Forest Improvement work by
performing under cost, whereas contractors have been allowed to profit."
3 Conform 1978a; Conform 1978c:No. 6.
* Conform 1978a.
" Conform 1978f.
4 Group Ventures are paid at cost rate for work performed, regardless of whether work
is performed above or below estimates. Contractors, however, are paid a flat rate. In
addition, contractors are actually paid higher rates than Group Ventures for the same jobs.
Under the new funding agreement agreed to in 1993, Group Ventures will be allowed to
profit from their Forest Improvement jobs, though they will still be paid at lower rates than
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Conform, with its aggressive and business-like attitude, may have had with the
vision conceived by program implementers.
In addition to these disagreements with program administrators in DLF,
local opposition was encountered due to the efforts of a local sawmill operator.
Through appearances on television, and advertisements and articles in newspapers
during the Spring of 1978, the mill owner was successful at garnering some
significant local opposition to Conform. Opposition was raised by preying upon
landowner fears of losing control of their land to government, and the promotion
of socialism. Though the threat of competition from Conform's proposed sawmill
may have had some influence upon his opposition, the primary motivation was
pressure from Scott who was the primary market for wood chips produced as a by-
product from the mill owner's operations." Scott strongly opposed the Group
Venture Program for fear it would increase woodlot organizing strength in the
concurrent efforts by the NSWOA to develop marketing boards. To some degree,
this opposition reflected a corporate policy opposing woodlot owner organization
which likely had some roots in distant decisions made by corporate headquarters
in the United States.
This opposition led to a number of public conflicts within the region. The
service area was reduced from Conform's original request after a chaotic public
meeting in Musquodoboit Harbour and a petition in Megher's Grant." At the
contractors.
* This mill owner subsequently became a shareholder in Conform.
" Conform 1979.
public meeting in Musquodoboit Harbor in November of 1978, the crowd was
incited by speeches from the oppositional mill owner into a strong and rowdy
opposition to inclusion in Conform's service area. Opposition in Megher's Grant,
particularly by several large land owners, resulted in a petition for exclusion from
the service area. These large landowners did not want to lose management
control of their land in order to gain access to Forest Improvement funds. This
opposition caused some internal problems for Conform, since the reduced service
area would cut off several committed members, including Board members. In the
end, Conform had little choice but to accept the service area which was agreed
upon by the Board in a split vote.
The main result of these differences was to slow down the development of
Conform. Shareholders did not agree to the 5 % commission until September, and
the service area was not resolved until January of 1979. Conform finally signed
an agreement with the Department of Lands and Forests in February of 1979, and
officially became a Group Venture.
Conform's Organization
Initially Conform had 15 shareholders who placed 2,065 acres of forest
under management." Both of these figures have grown steadily throughout
Conform's history, as described in Table 1. Today there are about 175
shareholders (about 230 woodlots) that cover about 37,000 acres. Shareholders in
* Conform 1978e. Shareholders owned a total of 10,703 acres.
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TABLE 1
Conform Annual Operating Statistics
Share Managmnt
holders Plans
25
50
80
105
103
117
125
149
158
167
83
92
101
126
132
139
Produc
Forest in
Managmnt
(acres)
4250
10298
15271
18708
19624
19148
22100
25800
27471
29065
Avg
Size of
Ownership
(acres)
195
206
191
Tot
Merch Avg Vol Road
Vol per Acre Construct
(000 ftA3)
7714
14811
26755
31690
(ftA3)
1815
1438
1750
(miles)
13
14.1
19.6
22.7
31.2
33.5
11.5
13.1
Surveying
(miles)
17.8
17.6
42.1
18.4
7.2
12.7
4.5
11
16
Silva-
Ponds culture
(acres)
2 302.6
6 670
5 992
220
898
7 901
994
857
0 514
2 489
739
Note: Spring 1993 estimates are about 170 owners, 225 management plans and 37,000 acres.
Source: Department of Lands and Forests, Annual Report, 1980 to 1990.
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
Conform are woodlot owners who agree to put woodlots (minimum of 50 acres)
under the management of the company. Owners do not have to place all forest
land under management, and many, in fact, have only a fraction of their woodlots
under management. A share in the company, which was initially $100 and is
currently $200, must be purchased for every woodlot placed under management
regardless of size. At annual meetings, each share represents one vote and no
shareholder can have more than 10% of the vote. The woodlot owner must also
sign an agreement with the following conditions:46
- Woodlot owner must sign a management plan for the woodlot developed
by Conform's forester and the woodlot owner. Plans detail the schedule
and type of work to be performed on the woodlot. Plans must be in
conformance with standards developed in the joint federal/provincial
agreements and approved by DNR forester.
- Payment to Conform of a 5% commission on all sales of wood products
(roadside price) from managed lots (excluding Christmas Trees).
- Agreements last 10 years, during which the woodlot must guarantee to
keep woodlot management under Conform. There are penalties for early
withdrawal from the agreement.
During the second provincial agreement the required management term was
changed to ten years after the last government assisted silvicultural treatment was
46 The landowner agreements are common to all Group Ventures.
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performed, though it returned to original policy in the subsequent agreement. As
Conform wrote, "Considerable resistance was encountered to this change, to the
point where some land owners have refrained from doing further forest
improvement work for the above reason."" Clearly, the length of the agreement
may provide some disincentive to those considering joining the company, as may
the 5% commission. However, the share cost and ten-year commitment of land
are also commitments significant enough to insure that those joining the company
are serious about their membership.
Conform agrees to insure that work in the management plan is followed,
and wood from silviculture and harvesting is sold. The only cost to woodlot
owners is the initial share and the 5% commission on wood sales. Most
silvicultural work is paid through the Forest Improvement funds from the
Department of Lands and Forests. The costs of harvesting are taken from the
price received for the sale of wood.
Though most woodlot owners have Conform perform all management
activities, members retain the option to do work themselves. This work is usually
limited to harvesting activities since maintenance of standards for silvicultural
work necessitates oversight and trained staff. Only a small fraction of members
(10-15%) actually perform any work on their own woodlots. Members then
receive the roadside price for the wood, less the 5% commission. Conform's
equipment can be rented (currently at $50 per hour) to perform harvesting
activities. For members requiring greater income from their woodlots, this option
" Conform [1983?]:2.
essentially allows them to become employees and receive the revenues from the
harvesting costs. For a number of members who have traditionally worked their
woodlots during the winter, his option allows them to continue to generate income
during these months.
The agreement offers landowners a number of benefits:
- Access to Forest Improvement funds for forest management work on their
lands. Woodlot owners could access funds through the individual Private
Lands Program, though assistance for roads is not as high.
- Development of a management plan in conjunction with Conform's
forester.
- The option for performance all management duties and activities including
insuring management plans are followed through, scheduling and arranging
of work, and work oversight.
- Marketing of wood by Conform's manager, which removes the necessity of
contacting and negotiating with purchasers. The potential for being
cheated by contractors who under-report wood volumes is also eliminated.
While Conform becomes the legal manager of the woodlots, it always defers to
the owner's preferences as management activities are undertaken. The intention
is to leave landowners in control of their woodlots.
Conform's staff includes a manager, office supervisor, and forester whose
salaries are paid by the government through the Operations Budget. Field crews
and a field supervisor are paid through Forest Improvement Funds, and costs
assessed to shareholders for harvesting and work not covered by Forest
Improvement Funds. The Board of Directors, comprised of seven individuals
elected by the shareholders, meets monthly with the manager to oversee
operations. Board members are paid a nominal fee for each meeting.
At the outset, Conform's manager and President of the Board were the
same individual, which lasted for the first few years of operation before he
stepped down as manager in 1981. Since this time the same manager has
presided, and a number of the original Board members still remain. Relations
between the Board and manager have been very stable throughout. The manager
reported that there had been no need to call a vote of the Board for five to six
years because all actions were agreed upon.
Members in Conform must be within the service area agreed upon with the
Department of Lands and Forests. After the initial service area was limited to
the Musquodoboit Valley, Conform has expanded in several directions: southeast
into the Mooseland and Moose River areas, southwest into Megher's Grants, and
north into the Stewiacke Valley. Initially the service area was about 115,000
48 4
acres, and has grown to 178,000 acres, the largest in the Province.49 Of the
initial 115,000 acres, about 7,000 acres is Crown land, 28,000 is owned by large
48 Group Management Viability Study 1982:22.
49 Agfor 1991:6.
companies, and the remaining 75,000 is small woodlot owners, eligible to join
Conform.5"
Finances
Finances are split between Operations, Forest Improvement and
Harvesting in accordance with the agreement with the DLF to facilitate program
administration. Revenues sources include wood sales, equipment rental, and
government funds. Operations costs (three staff and office expenses) are funded
through DLF assistance, less the 5 % commission from wood sales. Forest
Improvement costs are completely funded through DLF assistance. All remaining
costs, primarily harvesting and management costs not funded by DLF, are funded
through wood sales and equipment rentals. Table 2 shows that total expenses
(roughly equal to annual revenues since profits on operations have never
exceeded about $25,000 Canadian) ranged from $0.57 to $1.3 million Canadian
over the fiscal years of 1983 to 1991, excluding 1988 and 1989." Over this same
period, revenues from equipment rose significantly, from $35,000 in 1983-84 to
$216,000 in 1991-92, and commissions have increased, though erratically, from
" Group Management Viability Study 1982:22.
" Data from this range of years is used for all figures in this section.
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Table 2
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
Revenue
Conform
Wood Sale
49380
83060
222380
105900
225460
524845
369000
427680
384920
396040
486780
503660
DLF
Rental Commiss
34881
65393
106198
158654
201656
207214
216002
2469
4153
11119
5295
11273
18567
18450
21385
19246
21384
19246
25183
Operat's Fors Impr
59108
56934
63607
68100
61694
67863
70256
74367
79491
58829
79491
90000
90000
116438
242896
446484
215549
264409
303165
369534
266422
369356
265794
207214
257596
Note: Estimates are used for 90-91 & 90-92 Operating Expenses and Commission offsets.
Source: Conform financial statements, and Department of Lands and Forests Annual Reports, 1980 to 1990.
Total
Expenses
Total
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92
% of
Expenses
Funded
48.9
36.0
39.3
36.1
28.6
24.8
26.8
% of
Operat
Offset
4.0
6.8
14.9
7.2
15.4
21.5
20.8
22.3
19.5
26.7
19.5
21.9
277243
332272
373421
443901
345913
297214
347596
567459
922465
950687
1229167
1207781
1197714
1296101
$11,300 in 1983-84 to $25,000 in 1991-92.
Though Conform is the least dependent upon government funding of all
Group Ventures, it still relies upon assistance for a large portion of its funds.
Table 2 shows that government funding ranged from 49% to 29% of total
expenses over the fiscal years of 1983 to 1991, excluding 1988 and 1989. At the
outset of the Group Venture Program, officials hoped that Groups would
eventually become independent of operating funds by offsetting costs completely
with commissions. Conform, though better than most Group Ventures, is still far
from this goal. The percentage of Operations costs offset by commissions ranged
from 15% to 22% over the fiscal years of 1983 to 1991, excluding 1988 and 1989.
Conform has consistently shown an annual profit for its shareholders. In
addition, shares have been split three times as the value of the company has
grown.
Operations
Conform's operations are somewhat unique amongst Group Ventures
because a large amount of work is performed by the company rather than by
contractors. Ownership of equipment and hiring of crews has given Conform
greater control over work performed. Few other Groups have purchased
equipment or operated their own crews. Those that have purchased have very
few pieces and are unable to perform extensive work. Several Groups have been
unable to make equipment pay for itself, necessitating the sale of the pieces."
The need for greater control over forestry work became apparent early in
Conform's operations. Soon after incorporating, Conform had difficulty gaining
access to equipment or forestry services at the best times for their operations.
Access to equipment and services relied heavily upon local contractors and
equipment owners who were unreliable for a number of reasons." First,
equipment owners were likely to use equipment during the best periods, giving
Conform access on off-periods during bad weather or poor road conditions.
Second, contractors would often delay jobs if better ones (i.e. higher paying or less
demanding) arose. Third, it was often difficult to get contractors to do more
difficult and poorer quality jobs such as salvage and remnant removal. Fourth,
contractors often overcharged for work when they learned it was government
funded.
Reliance upon others for services and equipment made operations planning
and maintaining work schedules difficult. This situation was unacceptable to
management, so the Board of Directors who decided to purchase a second-hand
skidder from a Conform member to enable Conform to use its own crews. The
financial risks of this purchase elicited some concerns: one member was
wondering "How do we pay for it?" and to another it seemed like a somewhat
"dubious" venture. Within a year, however, the skidder had paid off for itself by
work done for Conform members, or through rentals.
5 Group Management Viability Study 1982:35.
" Redden 1992:2.
Conform has since purchased a number of other pieces equipment
including two forwarders, a bulldozer, and a road grader. Income from previously
purchased equipment has helped to fund the purchases of these successive pieces.
In general, each has paid for itself in a relatively short period of time. These
purchases are very important to Conform's ability to provide good services to its
shareholders. Having recourse to its own crews gives Conform greater control
over work schedules. In addition, Conform can demand better service from local
contractors by setting a standard on price, reliability and quality that they must
compete against.
In addition to controlling work schedules, operating its own crews allows
Conform to provide excellent quality service to its members. Among these are:
(1) pickup of all roadside wood even if it is not a full load; (2) pickup areas are
left relatively clean, often a problem when non-local truckers are used;5" (3)
woodlots are left relatively clean of stray logs and brush, and damage to soil and
saplings is minimized; (4) follow up inspections over one to two seasons by
Conform's forester to insure that forest conditions progress properly. One source
of this quality is good, reliable management and operators. Conform has
managed to secure an excellent manager, an excellent forester and an excellent
field supervisor (16 years with Conform). Many of the staff have worked for at
least ten years. The result is real continuity, an understanding of the standards of
work demanded, and a responsiveness to the shareholders (workers know they will
have return is work is inadequate).
" Conform is being forced to use Stora union truckers in its new agreement with them.
Conform's manager worries that these drivers will not pay the same attention to these
quality concerns as their current local trucker.
The tighter linkage between work crews and shareholders in Conform
seems to be an important factor in the quality of work performed. In typical
contractor-woodlot owner relations, the lot owner usually had little control over
the quality of work performed. Because of the infrequency of jobs (often every 5
to 10 years), especially with small woodlot owners, maintaining customer relations
is a small concern for contractors and woodlot owners have little recourse if work
is done poorly. Within Conform, however, there is much greater accountability
for the quality of work, and the education efforts behind the development of
management plans increases awareness of management quality.
Markets
Within the context of a generally poor market environment, Conform is in
a relatively good position. Primary markets are for pulpwood, hardwood fuel, and
sawlogs (see Table 3). Pulpwood markets are most critical because large
quantities of low-grade softwood, the major output from current overaged and
poorly managed stands, are produced in harvesting and silviculture work. Without
these markets, Conform would be unable to perform much of the Forest
Improvement work to increase future yields of sawlogs and higher quality pulp.
Conform's location allows for shipping to all three of the major pulp mills
in Nova Scotia: Bowater-Mersy, Scott, and Stora. In the past Conform has
marketed to all three mills, though currently Bowater does not take shipments as
far as Conform. Sales to Bowater and Stora are arranged through individual
quotas. Wood is sold to Scott through the Central Supply Division, which is the
TABLE 3
WOOD SALES (cords, except sawlogs - FBM)
Total
1333
2221
4741
1021
8100
5967
8485
8678
8350
8528
7779
8693
Studwood Hardwood
(fuel)
0 0
27 86
142 728
89 837
112
108
78
85
112
118
72
69
2400
2841
2360
3357
2132
2366
2565
1789
Sawlogs
120784
184355
420413
292007
325000
336421
146393
300096
312798
311094
543562
399310
412384
Source: Conform records.
Pulpwood
Bowater
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986487
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92
Stora
1903
3400
3547
5431
4234
3756
4419
Scott
1900
2200
2455
1821
4294
4023
4274
2164
2885
2676
1098
0
0
0
marketing board which negotiates with Scott for an annual quota and price.
Membership in the Division carries the benefits of an insured price and quota
negotiated by the Central Supply Division. However, it also carries the liability of
constraining access to that buyer, since members of the Division may sell to Scott
only through the Division and within their allowed quota. Conform felt this
pressure which at times became acute. In one circumstance, Conform was stuck
with 2,000 cords of wood at the road after Bowater reneged on a contract. Scott
was very interested in taking the wood, though to sell the wood Conform would
have to leave the Division because it was beyond their quota."
From the outset, however, Conform was a strong believer in the market
board and has stayed in the Central Supply Division through some tough times.
During the early 1980s, when Group Ventures were growing and needing larger
quotas, many withdrew from the Division to seek individual contracts with Scott."
Conform is one of the few who did not withdraw and was and has remained
closely involved with the negotiations with Scott. Conform's president became
President of the NSWOOA and the Central Supply Division in late 1983 and
remained so until late 1986. The current negotiating team is headed by
Conform's current manager.
Conform's position indicates a belief in the marketing boards and the need
to show sustained support for it. This broader perspective on woodlot owner
" Two years later the wood was sold to Stora for fuel. The deal was likely facilitated
by Lands and Forests officials who were concerned about the embarrassment of one of the
Group Ventures "wasting" 2,000 cords of wood.
56 NSWOOA-SSD 1984.
issues underscores a belief in the importance of woodlot ownership in tackling the
marketing problems key to woodlot owner betterment. It is unclear, however,
whether the decision to stay in the Division was made primarily as a reflection of
ideology, business sense, or personal involvement by a few individuals, particularly
Conform's President. From a business perspective, the long-run benefits appear
to have offset the short-term sacrifices. Conform had a number of other markets
which probably provided it with greater flexibility than other Groups. Many
Groups are now attempting to reenter the Division as it becomes stronger and
market condition outside of the Division become less stable and reliable. Reentry
is difficult, however, due to the Division's limited quota for its members.
Sawlogs are sold to a few local mills, three of whom are shareholders
including the sawmill owner who originally opposed Conform's creation. As most
sawmills have difficulty obtaining adequate supply, these mills generally take all
the wood Conform can generate. Further, prices tend to be consistent among
them because of good competition, inadequate supply and good information.
Hardwood is often sold for fuel through a few fuel-lot operations, one of which is
operated from Conform's woodlot. In 1992, Conform delivered fuel wood to
approximately 300 homes."
Obtaining quotas from the pulp mills typically requires negotiating an
initial quota, and then fulfilling that quota on a regular and timely basis.
Conform has an excellent reputation for building and maintaining quotas. At first
Conform was given a small quota (about 1000 cords) by Bowater, who, according
57 Redden 1992:5.
to the first manager, did not believe Conform could fill it. Conform was able to
meet and annually expand this quota (to 2,000 and 4,000 cords in succeeding
years) until it had become one of the major producers in the region. By
exhibiting reliability to their buyers, which other Group Ventures have been less
successful at, Conform has built up solid relationships with secondary producers
that are crucial to maintaining reliable market access for their shareholders.
Strong management and understanding of the forestry industry appear to be major
factors behind this success. In this marketing context, Conform's activities and
performance have more resembled those of a contractor with goals of making and
meeting quotas than a Group Venture with a focus on performing forest
improvement work.
Development of internal forestry capability through equipment purchases
provides Conform with the ability to access markets by giving them control over
harvesting and management. To maintain market quotas, producers must supply
wood reliably to the mill according to the agreed schedule. Without control of
harvesting and management, Conform might lose these quotas because it would
be unable to meet mill schedules. With the ability to access markets, the original
goal of developing a sawmill fell to the wayside. Because of excess demand for
sawlogs, control of harvesting technology is more important to market access than
actual control of processing technology.
Despite the official concerns over long-run supply shortages, a continuous
problem for Conform, and Group Ventures in general, is obtaining adequate
quotas for their wood. Quotas are typically the limiting factor in the level of
harvesting and silviculture performed." There is usually more salvage work and
cleanings than markets can support. At points in Conform's history, these
constraints have been large though they appear to be less significant at present.
Market constraints are greater on other Groups less successful at developing
markets than Conform. Some perform only silviculture treatments (as opposed to
harvesting) because available quotas are filled by wood produced in these
treatments.
For Conform, quota limitations become particularly acute during the
wintertime when cutting is at its heaviest. Many of the Conform members who
harvest their own woodlots would like to get larger quotas, but are constrained by
Conform's total quota and the market needs of other shareholders. This potential
conflict is managed through attention to fairness amongst members, and may be
tempered by the reality that much of the wood and markets would likely be
inaccessible were it not for Conform. Conform can provide some flexibility in the
size of a quota to a member if it is necessary. In one case, a member in need of
immediate funds was allowed a large disproportionate quota, though fairness to
other members quotas was also maintained.
The Group Venture Program, and other forestry assistance administered
through the General Development Agreements, may actually contribute to the
perpetual market problems facing woodlot owners by maintaining the oversupply
of wood. Wood supply from Group Ventures represents about 5% of total wood
58 Keith 1992:19; Redden 1992.
supply in 1989-90.'9 Despite the concerns of supply shortages which drive this
funding, none have occurred nor do any appear looming. Government supply
goals for the next 20 to 25 years call for 50% to 100% increases over current
supply." Without expansion of markets for wood products, market conditions
will become even worse for suppliers and government forestry assistance will
simply become a subsidy to the secondary industries."
Conform seems to have improved the market conditions of its members in
several respects:
1) Improved price -- Stumpage and wood price increases are achieved through
protection from deceptive contractors who give unfair prices or inaccurately report
harvest volumes, sale of all logs placed roadside including partial loads, and
obtaining regular producer prices with unregulated markets. In addition, the
ability of Conform officials to be directly involved in the marketing division
negotiations provides whatever price increases that can be obtained through the
marketing structure.
59 Nova Scotia Department of Lands and Forests 1990. Figure is somewhat understated
because of cutting for wood fuel, which, according to data from Reed on the all private
forests, increase private volume about 16% (Reed 1987).
Reed, 1987.
6 A recent effort to site a pulp mill in Western Nova Scotia does not appear unlikely
to be successful after several years of discussion. Another effort by the Nova Scotia Primary
Forest Products Marketing Board to initiate feasibility studies for a Finnish high-grade paper
enterprise met with little interest from within the Department of Lands and Forests. Lands
and Forests officials instead initiated their own study that reported resource conditions that
would be unsuitable for such a venture.
2) Improved market access -- Being able to devote full attention to marketing,
Conform's manager can attempt to increase quotas for members. For woodlot
owners who do not harvest regularly, Conform can insure them access to markets
under fair conditions. Wood can also be graded and sold to multiple markets to
maximize the return on the product.
While improving both price and market access, access improvements have been
more significant, particularly for woodlot owners without regular harvests. Some
contend that Group Ventures have had little significant impact upon prices,
particularly in the context of improving the overall market conditions and regional
differences within Eastern Canada.
Shareholders
Shareholders in Conform are a diverse group of individuals with diverse
interests in managing forestland. The largest landowner has about 3,000 acres
under management while the smallest have about the 50 acre limit. Landowner
interests in management range from forestry production to other non-production
values such as wildlife, mixed species stands, and small-scale sugar bush. Few
owners rely upon their woodlots for incomes -- according to the manager's
estimates, only 3 to 4 rely totally upon their woodlots for income and only 15 to
25 do some or all of their own harvesting. Roughly 20 % live outside of the
immediate region, and only a few (8-10) live outside of the province. In addition
to those woodlot managed by Conform, many shareholders also own woodlots that
they do not have managed under Conform for a variety of reasons.
Conform has never actively advertised or recruited members. New
members are attracted primarily through word of mouth and seeing activity on
adjacent properties. Because of the relatively slow pace of membership growth,
Conform has never had difficulty immediately servicing new member's woodlots.
In most cases, within a few months of joining, management plans are developed
and initial work begins. Only a few (less than five) members have failed to renew
their agreements after the initial ten-year period.
The philosophy of forest renewal and proper forest management appears to
have spread among Conform's members. All interviewed emphatically believed
that attitudes and values had changed significantly since the formation of
Conform. Education is promoted through bi-annual meetings, field days
demonstrating management principles and techniques, and personal interaction
with Conform's forester in the development of the management plan and
implementation of silviculture treatments. Conform's forester and manager often
respond to membership inquiries by taking potential members on tours of
member woodlots to show them the quality of work performed. Member
complaints, often by people without an understanding of forest management, are
responded to by showing treatments on other woodlots to educate the owner on
management principles and standards.
Changing Resource Conditions
As has been noted, poor resource conditions are the primary motivations
behind government funding of forest improvement efforts. The Group Ventures
role is often referred to as "junk collectors" who are collecting the remnants of
past poor practices and preparing for a new generation of healthy forests. One of
Conform's goals, as well as the entire Group Venture Program, is a wide-spread
transformation of the forest resource in Nova Scotia. Attainment of this goal
requires both broad participation in the program and implementation of improved
forest practices. Despite Conform's financial success, they have still only reached
woodlot owners representing about 20% of woodlot acreage in their service
area.6 2 Though a few receive assistance through the Private Lands Program,
most of the remainder either perform no management or manage in their manner.
Forest management on lands owned by Conform have undergone a
dramatic transformation: from being underused and unmanaged. they have
become intensively managed and maintained. Conform's management focusses
upon thinning, cleaning, shelterwood cutting, clearcutting, and stand conversion.63
Management is generally aimed at producing sawlogs through pre-commercial or
commercial thinning," stand conversion,65 and cleanings. Conform also
undertakes a great deal of salvage cuts to remove overaged or poorly developing
forests. Management promotes a mix of softwood, hardwood and mixed stands,
particularly to suit individual land owner desires.
62 Conversation with Conform's current manager.
63 Keith 1992:21. Most information in this section is derived from Keith and
conversations with Conform's manager.
* Removal of a portion of trees at an early or intermediate stage to promote growth of
quality trees in the remaining stand.
65 Removal of overstory of undesirable trees to allow an understory of desirable trees
to develop.
Salvage cuts and harvests may be undertaken by selective cutting or
clearcuts. Clearcuts are generally performed in small areas, less than 5 acres, and
generally leave trees and snags throughout the cut and near borders. "Perch
trees" are also left to promote raptor habitat which can keep mice populations,
which eat regenerating seedlings, low. Because Conform utilizes work crews with
power saws, these practices have little impact upon the efficiency of operations.
In contrast, land managed for the pulp companies utilizes large equipment that is
incapable of such discriminate practices.
Conform's management is particularly attuned to wildlife concerns.
According to Keith, "They regularly leave snags, woodpecker trees, and small
islands of trees within small clearcuts".' The high priority given to wildlife is
partially a reflection upon Conform's forester who has a particular interest and
concern for maintaining habitats.
Though regeneration is a major element of the Provinces overall program,
Conform actually performs little because it believes natural regeneration is
adequate. The effectiveness of natural regeneration is promoted by Conform's
practices that tend to minimize disturbance to the land. Little spraying or ground
preparation work is performed, despite efforts by people in the Lands and Forests
office to encourage this practice.
From a forest productivity standpoint, forest conditions are clearly vastly
improved. Current management produces mostly pulpwood from a combination
66 Keith 1992:23.
of silvicultural practices and some harvests. Future harvests will see a much
improved forest producing increasing volumes of sawlogs and higher grade pulp.
From an ecological standpoint, conditions also appear improved. Past practices
proved to be highly ecologically damaging, promoting low-grade, less complex
forests. Overall, current management practices appear to be a vast improvement.
One reservation, however, is the large areas of land opened up through the
program of road building. Conform alone has built or improved about 197 miles
of road from 1979 to 1988, while the entire Group Venture program has built or
improved about 1,242 miles of road over the same period.67 From an ecological
viewpoint, opening up areas of land on this scale may diminish regional
ecosystems where these non-utilized played important ecological functions.
Though forest practices may be greatly improved, it is still unclear whether they
are better than conservation.
67 Nova Scotia Department of Lands and Forests 1979-88.
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Chapter 4 - Analysis of Conditions of Collective Action
Introduction
Previous chapters described the historical roots of the Group Venture
Program, and the formation and operations of Conform, Inc., one of the more
successful Group Ventures. In this chapter, I analyze the conditions and
circumstances under which Conform operates to determine which factors are most
crucial to Conform's formation and subsequent successful operations.
Conform is chosen for analysis because it is among the most successful of
Group Ventures in several respects. First, it has among the highest levels of
harvesting and provision of forest management services. This may not be the best
measure of success since other Group Ventures are confronted with more difficult
conditions, such as forests damaged by the Spruce Bud Worm or irregularly
shaped parcels to consolidate.' But, it is an important measure of organizational
health and vigor, particularly since maintaining adequate and reliable volumes has
been a persistent problem for woodlot cooperatives.2 Second, in the event of a
large reduction or elimination of government funding, Conform is one of the few
(if not only) Group Venture that would survive. This viability is reflected in its
lesser dependence upon government funds and the likelihood that services it can
provide without government assistance would still be demanded by woodlot
One group venture, La Foret, has had to consolidate the long, thin parcels resulting
from the French practices of inheritance. In this practice, land divided amongst heirs is
sliced along the parcels length so that all parcels have access to roads. The result is a
pattern of land parcels like lines on paper.
2 Simon and Scoville 1983:18.
owners.
These success criteria relate to goals that both Conform members and the
government place in collective management. Members desire some combination
of improved woodlot conditions, higher woodlot productivity, and better woodlot
income, while government is concerned almost solely with increasing aggregate
small woodlot production. So while a Group Venture may meet the goals of
members by improving conditions and outputs of their woodlots, it may not meet
government objectives if participation is not broad and aggregate productivity
increases are not significant. These government goals add an external
performance dimension to the analysis that might not exist if only the interests of
collective members were considered. While there is no intention here to measure
such performance, by broadening the definition of success it changes the
conditions and factors identified as most important.
Another important factor is the range of management and marketing
options available to woodlot owners. Basic options include non-management, self-
management, management by contractors and foresters, and management by
Group Venture. Owners may select one option to handle all management
activities, or use different options for different elements of management and
marketing. Options also affect different avenues for obtaining forestry assistance
(Private Lands or Group Venture Programs), different levels of direct government
involvement (government foresters versus Group Venture foresters or private
foresters), and different levels of regulation (government management criteria or
no regulation). To some degree, analysis of Conform's success compares the
various options available to woodlot owners to determine why woodlot owners
choose collective management and how Conform creates the conditions under
which they choose collective management.
In analyzing Conform, a number of important questions arise: Which
factors, such as program benefits or an existing desire for the operational and
marketing benefits of collective management, were most important in inducing
action by Conform? Given the option to obtain funding individually through the
Private Lands Program, why would local people expend the organizational energy
to form a Group Venture? Why do members choose to join Conform rather than
pursue funding through the Private Lands Program, or manage without
governmental strings? How does Conform achieve success despite rules limiting
its ability to act as an independent business? Why does Conform operate a
productive and healthy collective though incentives for such direction are not
present?
To organize the analysis of this relatively complex set of factors and
relations, conditions are organized into four categories: physical conditions,
market conditions, member characteristics, and internal rules and organization.
Physical conditions refer to the physical characteristics of the resource, the
geographic pattern of ownership and fragmentation, and the available
management technologies and options. Market conditions refer to the potential
users of forest outputs, their other supply options, the competitiveness of users,
and the implications of these markets upon management options. Member
characteristics refers to the socio-economic status of members, their available
income options, their past relationships and organizational histories, and their
skills and knowledge of forestry and organizations. Internal rules and
organization are by the most complex set of conditions. They include the options
for resource extraction and maintenance, rules for collective membership and
decision-making, organizational characteristics, particular group decisions, and
relations with government actors who mutually determine the collective's rules
and organization.
Physical Conditions
Small woodlot owners in Nova Scotia hold roughly half of its forestland,
while in Musquodoboit Valley they own between 55 and 60 percent. Industrial
holdings, primarily by Scott, range between 20 and 24 percent. These figures
show that small woodlot owners are an important source of wood supply, and are
present in large enough numbers to give a collective management company
adequate wood supply.
The forest resource is generally degraded, producing large amounts of low-
grade (over-aged) pulpwood and declining amounts of sawlogs. Limited markets
exist for such low-quality wood, thus placing limitations on the pace of forest
renewal activities. Within the generally overaged and undermanaged Nova Scotia
forests, however, Musquodoboit Valley has relatively good conditions. Other
regions, such as those infested by the Spruce Bud Worm, have worse conditions,
while some areas, such as the province's western portion, have better.
Changes in the harvesting technology have led to changes in forest
practices, a growth of contractors, and an increasing scale of operations.
Increasing economies of scale in management operations make use of these
technologies on individual small woodlots infeasible. Small woodlot owners are
unable to afford the investments in forest equipment and therefor must rely on
antiquated technology, or contractors who are less liable to provide high quality
service, more discriminating about jobs they will work, and potentially less honest
in quoting prices or reporting wood harvest volumes. By blocking small woodlots
and managing collective holdings as a single unit, Conform is able to achieve the
economies of scale in operations that make it competitive with contractors.
Through the purchase of equipment and operation of its own crews,
Conform has gained increased control over the production process which is
integral to its success. This choice was critical due to the unreliability of
contracting out certain tasks. By controlling the means of production, Conform is
able to provide its members with higher service quality, better service accessibility
and reliability, and lower costs.
Though contracting is used successfully by other Group Ventures, access to
the means of production assures Conform that they have a recourse if contractors
are unreliable, and allows them to set a performance baseline for services.
Equipment ownership also provides potential profits several ways. First, vertical
integration of harvesting and management allows all the value added and resource
rents (i.e. stumpage) to be captured by Conform's shareholders. Second, profits
can be earned through equipment rental and harvesting activities. These profit
sources are important to Conform's finances, since, until recently, government
regulations have prohibited profit making on all Forest Assistance work.
In addition to making equipment investments, Conform's ability to make
these investments pay financially is equally crucial, since other Group Ventures
that have purchased equipment either can support only a single piece of
equipment or have failed to produce enough work to pay for them. The success
of these investments can be attributed to the business experience and goals of its
members, along with the physical resource and market conditions that produce a
large enough base of work to make equipment viable.
Equipment ownership also allows shareholders to perform work on their
own woodlots by providing them access to equipment at a reduced rate. This
option gives shareholders access to an income opportunity they might otherwise
not have.
Market Conditions
Market conditions are among the major factors behind inactivity on small
woodlots. Low roadside prices, due to highly oligopolistic pulpwood markets and
subsidized access to state forests, give owners little incentive to manage woodlots
for production. Market conditions for other products (such as sawlogs) are
somewhat better, though resource outputs of these products are small and
necessitate improved low-grade markets if management is to increase their yields.
Efforts to improve the marketing structure for small woodlot owners have been
opposed by the pulp industry leading to watered-down legislation: lack of binding
arbitration and lack of recognition of woodlot owners. Low- cost government
leases have also lowered the baseline cost for pulpwood. As a result, pulpwood
prices are the lowest in North America and assuring adequate and reliable quota
is difficult. Access to markets is also constrains woodlot management because
those without regular harvests usually must go through contractors or middlemen
in order to obtain quotas.
Further compounding the effect of low roadside prices, woodlot owners
find themselves squeezed between by contractors attempting to maximize the
margin between stumpage prices to owners and the depressed wood prices offered
by mills. Given the lack of time, information, and options available to woodlot
owners, stumpage prices generally suffer. Clancy describes these relations as a
'a forest fibre chain', a network "typically characterized by key control points,
representing economic actors with strong bargaining power vis-a-vis other
elements in the chain."3
Collective management can do little to improve roadside prices, except
support external efforts, such as the marketing boards, to improve price
conditions. Conform has actively engaged in this process, though the size of
actual price improvements achieved is debateable. Collective management can,
however, improve the stumpage price to owners dealing with contractors by
appropriating contractor profits and insuring prices and harvested volumes are
accurately quoted. Collective management can also improve access to market,
particularly for those without regular quotas, and can batch small amounts of high
quality logs from multiple woodlots to increase sale revenues.
' Clancy 1992:143. Quoting: Winson, Anthony. "Researching the Food Processing-
Farming Chain: The Case of Nova Scotia", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology.
(25,4), 1988, p. 524.
Located centrally in the Province, the Valley has good proximity to all
three major pulpwood markets and has a number of sawmills within its immediate
region. The combination of both proximate markets and good quality resource
appears to be very important to the likelihood of successful forest management
operations. Possessing either markets or resource quality alone does not yield the
same potential. However, possessing both markets and resource quality does not
insure success, as a number of other Group Ventures with conditions similar to
Conform's have not achieved near its success.
Conform has an excellent record of developing and maintaining market
quotas. Conform management recognizes the need to deliver agreed quantities of
wood to buyers on schedule if quotas are to be maintained. The ability to reliably
deliver wood relies upon Conform's control of the local means of production and
the business skills and marketing experience of Conform's past and present
managers.
Whether or not these improvements are significant enough to induce
woodlot owners to actively manage for production is debatable. Income from
woodlots will never be large until prices increase significantly, thus making other
management goals more attractive or failing to overcome management apathy.
However, if marketing conditions are much better - higher prices, easier access -
then the incentives for collective management are less, since there is less need for
a manager to develop markets and coordinate their delivery, and woodlot owners
be less inclined to pay a 5% commission on sales. This tendency was noted by
Bratton in early U.S. forest cooperatives: "The small independent forest
cooperatives have found the going rough in times of good markets for stumpage.
In such periods, the strong stimulus of a marketing service has been needed less."4
Specific relations with market actors can effect a collective's success, since
these actors can use market or political pressure to oppose the development of a
collective organization. The forest industry, and pulp industry in particular,
showed strong opposition to the Group Ventures, and even incited local
opposition in the Musquodoboit Valley in an effort to derail Conform's efforts.
This opposition reflects a perceived threat that woodlot organization may upset
the balance of power in market and political relations that currently favor the
pulp industry. Though Conform has never experienced a direct economic boycott
by pulp mills hoping to break the collective, other Group Ventures may have
encountered such boycotts or more subtle tactics to disrupt collectives. As
Conform has grown and become established, these attitudes have changed: several
local sawmill owners have become shareholders and market relations with the
pulp mills have improved. For both sawmills and pulpmills, any potential threat
posed by Conform has been outweighed by its reliability in supplying wood.
Relations with contractors has been variable. While the Provincial
agreements increase the amount of work available, Group Venture, particularly
those providing their own services, may supplant contractors. Conform's manager
comments that though
"contractors, especially those who do not work for groups, have complained
that group ventures are putting them out of business through unfair
* Bratton 1949:185.
competition for forest improvement work ... Most group ventures have
good working relationships with the contractors in their areas. The
majority of complaints about group ventures seems to arise from a vocal
minority of contractors."'
Though Conform performs a large portion of its own work, much work,
particularly silviculture treatments, is performed by contractors. Conform's
relations with contractors seems to have been mixed, good with some and less
successful with others, though has not had a significant effect either way in its
success.
Poor relations between contractors, brokers (marketing middlemen) and
industrial users is noted by Simon and Scoville as one of the problem areas for
forest cooperatives.' Basis for these antagonisms is in both increased powers the
cooperative gives to the woodlot owner (such as increased bargaining power with
industrial users) and the fear by brokers, contractors, and foresters of competition
from, and potential replacement by, the collectives. Among seven cooperatives in
the United States, some opposition by industrial users, brokers and foresters was
noted, though, in general, "cooperatives enjoy reasonably good relations with the
firms or market outlets to whom they sell."
Redden 1992.
6 Simon and Scoville 1983:19.
7 Simon and Scoville 1983:20.
Local/Membership Conditions
Conditions in Musquodoboit Valley and among small woodlot owners
generally appear conducive to the formation of a collective forest management
company. Key factors are past experience with community organizations, a group
of motivated and experienced woodlot owners, a history of forest management,
and a small core of experienced and skilled individuals.
The breadth of human resources in the Musquodoboit region seemed to
provide the right mix needed for the formation of a Group Venture. People in
the region provided leadership, management and business skills, knowledge of the
forestry industry, motivation and aggressiveness, and past experience with
cooperative efforts. The number of people necessary to the Group's formation
and management success were relatively few, however. Because of Conform's
stability, only about six or seven people have been crucial to its management and
growth.
Conform's first president and manager had a history of involvement in
local development, particularly the development of a half-million dollar flood
control project in the mid-1960s. While he was mainly interested in agriculture,
the opportunity for a significant local project in forestry prompted his
involvement. This community leader's involvement shows how the Group Venture
program, primarily created to promote forest management, was utilized on the
local level by individuals with broader development objectives.
Other individuals also had significant experience. The current manager,
and one of the founders, is an accountant who had previously worked in a mill.
Another was a mill owner who had been an active advocate for improved forest
practices and was a member on the Provincial Forest Practices Improvement
Board and director and president of the Nova Scotia Forest Products Association.
The head of the Forestry Committee on the old Musquodoboit Rural
Development Board was also one of the founders.
The mix of human resources possessed by Conform, particularly leadership
and management and business skills, seems to be lacking in some of the other
Group Ventures, and are often the source of future troubles. Few of the original
Group's possessed the business attitudes held by Conform's founders. This seems
to be partially a reflection of the specific experiences and skills of individuals, as
well as a general attitude of those in Musquodoboit Valley. In addition, much of
the aggressiveness and tenacity of Conform's organizers necessary to overcoming
the hurdles of local opposition and government disputes may not be so present in
other regions.
Most of the founders were active managers of their own woodlots, many
looking for better economic conditions under which to manage their woodlots.
Though a minority, the number of woodlot owners either deriving income from
their woodlots or in need of income was large enough to form the core interested
in collective management. Other land owners may have past experiences with
forestry that inclines them toward an opportunity to better utilize their woodlots.
In addition to these factors, the community possessed other characteristics, such as
a history of working on the land, stable land tenures, close-knit local ties.
important to the formation of a collective management company.
Mistrust of the government by locals may increase the likelihood of owners
accepting government support through an independent cooperative. Hundert et
al. noted that "equally well known, is the distrust which many Nova Scotia woodlot
owners have traditionally harbored about government intention with respect to
their lands ... any potential program for improved management of small woodlots
must ensure that the ultimate responsibility for decisions about management
remains in the hands of the woodlot owners."' The program addresses these fears
by allowing landowners to approve management plans, implementation of which is
still very much in the landowners control.
The suitability of local conditions is evident by the quick organization upon
learning of the collective management pilot project in West Pictau. This quick
reaction to outside opportunities was not unprecedented within the Valley. One
report states that "The Board [MRDB] has been remarkably successful in
involving research workers and others in the study of the valley's problems, " and
goes on to say that "the efforts of the board.. .present a model for the type of
'grass roots' involvement which is believed to be essential for change and
development in rural areas of Canada." 9 The Board had previously been able to
facilitate the placement of a rural development officer within the region, gain
funding for a flood control program, and assist transportation and hospital service
improvements. The groundwork in community organization laid out by the
Musquodoboit Rural Development Board seems to have provided a pre-existing
organizational disposition that could be utilized in the quick formation of
8 Hundert et al. 1988:9.
9 Redpath 1974:3.
Conform.
Long-standing interest in marketing, and, in some cases, collective
marketing or equipment ownership also appears to have contributed significantly
to the quick formation of the Groups across the Province. The Group Venture
Program may have tapped some dormant interest in collective management that
lacked a vehicle for implementation. Organization through the NSWOA, while
not extremely broad and deep, appears to have developed leadership amongst a
number of individuals who then participated in the formation of individual Group
Ventures. Though most of NSWOOA's efforts focused on developing marketing
boards, it was involved in the formation of the original West Pictau pilot project
and has been supportive ever since. For those involved in woodlot owner issues,
Group Ventures represented a great opportunity to improve woodlot owner
conditions by directly providing services and making forest management
economical for small woodlot owners.
In reality, motivations for formation varied from region to region.
Variations often reflected regional character and economic conditions. One
region with a high proportion of transplants from the central provinces ("come-
from-aways") focussed upon performing ecologically sound forest management. A
great many, accustomed to receiving the benefits of Canada's social services, saw
a government program as a way to employ several local individuals. These
Groups tend to view themselves as "arms of government" who are implementing
forestry assistance. Others, however, saw the opportunity to develop a business
which is a more independent vision. Any analysis of the Group Venture Program
must recognize that each locale has fashioned its organization to meet particular
local conditions, and the interests of those forming the Group. The effect of any
set of incentives will, therefore, vary from locale to locale.
Internal Rules/Organization
This section addresses the complex set of rules and organizational decisions
to determine which factors are most important to Conform achieving its success.
Conform's organization is shaped by a combination of external (primarily
governmental) and internal decisions. The legal form of membership agreements
and relations between the government and the Group Venture is mostly
determined by rules originating in the joint Provincial/Federal agreements, with
minimal woodlot owner input. Within these government rules, Conform makes its
own organizational choices and operations rules to meet its particular group goals.
Because of this close linkage between Conform and the government program,
some important questions arise as to the nature of this relationship: What is the
impact of the government's framework upon formation and membership
decisions? How Conform produces success within these external rules? How do
specific relations between Conform organizers and the government administrators
affect successful organization?
The Group Venture Program provides many of the basic incentives and
benefits to enable collective action. The problem of initial formation is partially
overcome by providing: funding of incorporation and operations costs, technical
assistance on incorporation procedures, the "model" of operations developed in
the West Pictau pilot project, and a minimal requirement of only ten initial
members. In addition, potential employment in the Group Venture and full
funding of boundary line improvement and road construction, which are funded at
only 60% in the Private Lands Program, may have provided important additional
incentives. Particularly important is full funding of roads, which are very
expensive and represent one of the more important early investments for forest
management because of access woodlot access they provide.
The role of these incentives in spurring action cannot be underestimated.
As the first manager and President says, without access to funds, we "could have
organized, but probably would not have organized." Several people indicated that
they probably would not have joined without the "incentive" of forest management
funding. For other Group Ventures with less business-oriented goals, funding
access was a, if not the, key motivation for forming. The prospects of a local
government program, with new direct and indirect job opportunities, were a
significant benefit in many regions where rural unemployment and
underemployment are problems.
Formation necessitates the time, energy, and, often, finances of several
individuals and institutions. As Olson points out, the return on these
"investments" in public goods is often not great unless the person investing is
receiving a very large portion of the collective benefits." Due to the temptation
of others to "free ride" on these efforts, Olson concludes "unless the number of
individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device
0 Olson 1965.
to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests."" While
many of the conditions do not fit Olson's assumptions," his pessimism about the
likelihood of collective action seems to be contrasted by the quick, widespread
formation of Group Venture's and the success of Conform.
For Conform to be successful it must meet the goals of potential members
by presenting them with a better management option than alternatives, and it
must operate an efficient and healthy organization with a large membership to
meet government goals. Individual decisions to join Conform are based upon an
internal calculation of the costs and benefits of members. The Group Venture
Program provides a number direct incentives to membership and a number of
potential incentive that require successful Group Venture operations to be
realized. In addition, some program requirements act as disincentives, and others
may result from the particular operations of the specific Group Venture.
Direct incentives include forest improvement funding and management
plans, though access to these still depends upon the fair operations of the Group
Venture. In addition, Group Ventures have the potential to provide improved
wood marketing, management oversight, follow through of management plans,
improved service quality, and the option to self-manage one's woodlot.
Disincentives include the ten-year management commitment, the five-percent
" Olson 1965:2.
12 Conform is probably a small group under Olson's criteria, and government funding is
likely considered "individualized or non-collective benefits" (Olson 1965:150) that represent
a "special device".
commission, and reduced control over management criteria. These disincentives
may keep some with forest near harvest, or those wanting to maintain total
autonomy over management, from joining.
While the structure of the Group Venture Program has successfully
overcome the problems of stimulating collective action and created the potential
for large incentives to potential members, to some degree, it has created
organizations dependent upon government funding for sustained operations and
often lacking the membership growth and production of a healthy organization.
Groups rely heavily upon government funding to maintain operations. This
reliance becomes potentially debilitating at the end of a joint federal/provincial
agreements when future funding is uncertain. This uncertainty creates extreme
anxiety in many Group Ventures whose continued operations are at stake. This
problem occurs because, in a number of respects, program design has failed to
provide adequate incentives for Groups to become independent or increase
activity. First, Operations funding is essentially constant for all Groups, regardless
of the amount of work or activity they perform. While resource and ownership
conditions differ greatly across the Province, this practice is increasingly seen as
promoting inefficient operations.
Second," Operations funding, which is paid up front and calculated using
estimated commissions, is adjusted to final costs at the end of each year if actual
commissions are lower or higher than estimates. This practice, however, gives
Groups the incentive to minimize wood sales at the end of the year if they are
" Peat, Marwick and Partners 1986:V-6.
93
approaching their estimated commissions.
Third,'" Forestry Assistance funding is based upon work receipts (if
performed by contractors) so Groups are unable to profit from this work. Many
of the more business oriented Groups complain that contractors are able to profit
from Forestry Assistance work so they should be able to as well. A recent
reevaluation of many of these rules has resulted in a new funding formula
intended to promote independence and efficiency." Operations funding is now
based upon a number of performance measures including the size of the Group's
Forest Improvement expenditures, the number of plans managed, and the number
of shareholders within the Group. Flat rates are now used for Forest
Improvement work so Groups can profit from this work.
The Department of Natural Resources, driven by concerns over funding
and promoting efficiency, has begun to take some steps to increase incentives for
improved management of Group Ventures. A new funding formula for operating
budgets bases about half of a Group's operating budget on performance measures
including the size of the Group's Forest Improvement expenditures, the number of
plans managed, . and the number of shareholders within the Group. In addition,
Forest Improvement funds will be administered on a flat rate, thus allowing
Group Ventures to profit (or lose) on the performance of this work. In some
respects, the new formula is an effort to increase efficiency of Group Ventures
and provide incentives for increasing membership to help achieve the
" Redden 1991; Peat, Marwick and Partners 1986.
" "New funding formula for Group Ventures" 1993:1; The Group Venture Association
of Nova Scotia 1992.
government's goal of increased total small woodlot production.
These changes may lead to the dissolution of Groups unable to function on
reduced operations funds due to low performance. For Conform, however, the
changes will likely result in both increased operations funds, because of Conform's
high ranking on performance measures, and the potential for increased profits
from forest assistance work.
Conform's organizational health and vigor are evident from its ability to (1)
provide all of the potential benefits of collective management to members, and
(2) operate a productive and viable organization despite a lack of government
incentives to do so. This organizational health and vigor, which derives largely
from Conform's internal rules, relations, and decisions, is at the root of Conform's
success. Though much of Conform's organizational structure is determined by
Program requirements, the actual operations and organization of the company are
largely the result of internal decisions. These operations include allocation of
services and marketing among members, developing the means of providing
services and markets, maintaining a skilled and loyal staff, and, most importantly,
developing effective decision-making procedures that allow fulfillment of group
goals. These crucial internal rules, relations, and decisions are often the
distinguishing factors between successful and less successful collective efforts.
Relations between the manager, Board of Directors, and shareholders has
been remarkably good with few conflicts over its history. The relations between
the Board and the manager are very important to success and have been a source
of problems in many other Group Ventures. Conform has none of these
problems and the manager operates with the complete confidence of the board.
Problems in other Groups have ranged from difficulty with incompetent and
uninterested managers to difficulty finding interested and competent Board
members. In some cases where the manager from within the community or group
of original founders was not completely competent, their dismissal has been a
source of some tension and conflict for the Group Venture.
Conform has also successfully mitigated potential conflicts among
shareholders. Shareholder conflicts have been minimized through efforts to
maintain fairness in access to services and markets, efforts to insure high quality
and reliable services, addressing problems before the cause internal conflicts, and
the company's willingness to assume financial risks rather than the shareholders. 6
The quality of the relations is a reflection of the quality and stability of managers,
staff, and the Board, and Conform's ability to please shareholders. Management
maintains an underlying rule of fairness in the provision of services and market
quota, while still remaining flexible to the immediate needs of shareholders. The
story told earlier of Conform giving a large wood quota to a member in financial
difficulty reflects this flexibility. Other groups have often been less successful at
maintaining this fairness, often not following up on management plans successfully
or distributing market quota on less-than-equitable terms.
Conform, like many of the Group Ventures, is operated as a company.
which seems to make for speedier and more assertive decision making. A few of
16 In the situation, described earlier, where Conform was left with 2,000 cords of wood
roadside, Conform paid shareholders for their cuts in spite of the lack of a market for the
wood.
the Group Ventures organized as cooperatives have run into difficulty with
procedural necessity of obtaining consensus of the cooperative on decisions
needing quick responses. In one case, a cooperatively organized Group Venture
lost an offer to sell a piece of equipment because the process of obtaining
collective consensus was too slow. The limited interest of many owners in their
woodlots may reduce the need for a consensus structure.
Group decision-making allowed for the purchase of equipment despite
potential risks. This decision was vital to achieving group goals since it insured
service quality and reliability, market reliability, and a means of making profit.
Such a decision requires internal communication of the problem, willingness to
assume risk to achieve group goals, and the ability to make sound and
incremental business decisions, all of which are difficult enough to perform in a
regular business let alone a business where decisions must meet collective
scrutiny.
The organizational quality is further reflected in the staff stability which
has helped produce higher quality work because staff understand the companies
standards and shareholders come to expect a certain type of service. This
continuity allows the development of stable working relationships between staff,
the Board of Directors, and shareholders. In addition to maintaining staff
continuity, new individuals must be brought into the organization if transitions
when personnel leave are to be smooth. Conform has continuously trained
individuals to fill various future roles: the current manager was trained by the
previous ones and new Board members are brought on with an expectation of
bringing real contributions within three years.
Conform's success must also be attributed to the particular decisions made
by the collective, and its management. The decision to run Conform like a
business gives the company strong direction and focus upon its viability and
serving its shareholders. This business philosophy provided the performance
incentives and management criteria that were lacking from the Group Venture
Program's structure. This philosophy facilitated key decisions such as the
purchase of equipment, continued membership in the Scott marketing district, and
the aggressive pursuit of markets quotas.
These management considerations are perhaps among the most important
for a forestry collective's sustained and productive operation. Simon and
Scoville" identify a number of problems areas for management of forestry
collectives, including: inadequate planning, poor membership relations, misguided
business investments, losing owner interest and inadequate communications in
long time lags between harvests, adjusting management to varied owner interests,
inadequate capital development, and inadequate service development. Many of
these problems, particularly financial problems and their associated risks, are
addressed through government funding which assurances Group Ventures of
incoming revenues.
One of the greatest problems facing forestry collectives is the relative
disinterest of owners in their woodlots and the long time periods between woodlot
management activity. Maintaining an active core and a generally interested
membership can both be inhibited. Several factors seem to combat these
" Simon and Scoville 1983:18-20.
problems in Conform, and the Group Ventures. First, Conform's business
philosophy clearly focuses the goals of management, leaving less opportunity for
membership to become divided to unclear on the collective direction. This focus
may also cater more directly to a range of individuals than a more complex set of
goals. Second, particularly within the Musquodoboit Valley, there exists a core of
individuals with significant interest in maintaining the collective effort. Finally,
funding of the forest renewal process, with its more continuous flow of
management plans and forest assistance work, increases the frequency and level of
woodlot owner involvement, thus facilitating more direct communication and
organizational involvement.
Shareholders involvement in Conform's operations is relatively high. Bi-
annual meetings draw a large percentage of owners, and Conform also holds
periodic educational field days to increase woodlot owner understanding of forest
management. Other Groups have had difficulties with turn-out at meetings,
sometimes failing to obtain a voting quorum necessary to make certain collective
decisions.
Relations between the government and Conform (and the other Group
Ventures) is particularly important because of the large government role in
determining collective rules and administering funding. It is unclear how much
input Group Ventures have into the design of the Program. Early conflicts reflect
a lack of input by potential organizers into the form of the program, resulting in
much of the structure of today's Group Ventures. Though the NSWOA supported
the formation of the West Pictau pilot project, it is unclear how much input was
utilized in its design. Fortunately in the long run, the original design appears to
have been free from major problems, with the most significant changes occurring
only recently. However, as Redden points out, "at this time woodlot owners do
not have any representation at the decision making level of the forestry
program."" Though input is sought, it is not required and is utilized by
government officials at their discretion.
Relations with some government officials have also greatly influenced the
fortunes of the Group Venture program. Much of the program's success is the
responsibility of the forester who directly managed the program in its early years.
Endowed with past experience working with woodlot owners, this forester
understood both how to work with people and the problems facing small woodlot
owners. These characteristics gave him a sensitivity to woodlot owner needs and
made him an advocate of the Group Ventures in interdepartmental battles. This
forester's appointment represents a turning point in the program's direction as
Group's were encouraged to move beyond bureaucratic holdups and focus among
starting up operations. Disputes with particular officials over contract agreements
were quickly resolved and Group Ventures began focusing on performing forestry
assistance work.
This forester continued to represent the Group Ventures in inter-
departmental battles. Group Ventures seemed to be somewhat protected from
these conflicts by its implementing forester. though many limitations on operations
resulted. In one case, purchase of computers from Operations funds was
supported by this forester in spite of opposition from the head of his section. One
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18 Redden 1992.
person characterized the difference in approach as between those trained in
industrial forestry and those trained in social forestry, or working with woodlot
owners. 9 The industrial foresters, from this perspective, were never able to
support the woodlot owners because training had biased them toward industrial
solutions to forestry problems.
An important factor in developing Group independence is the system for
providing funding assistance. The relationship between program administrators
and Group Venture managers significantly affects the level of trust and
accountability with which funding is allocated. A potential tension exists between
the Group Venture's need to have funding provided flexibly at their discretion,
and the administrator's need to maintain accountability and efficiency of fund
usage. Funds are allocated on the basis of annual submissions that detail the
amount of work to be performed and its cost. Management plans are developed
in accordance with a manual of procedures and approved by regional foresters.
Work is periodically reviewed to insure quality and audits of contractor costs are
performed.
There appears, however, to be a good bit of leeway to insuring that all
costs and work are being targeted solely to increased production. This can occur
in several ways. First, some who join the Program do so simply to gain services
for ends that are not consistent with program goals. Road building, for example,
19 For the motivated administrator, Group Ventures provided an excellent tool for
increasing the amount of forestry assistance provided. One official indicated that as
Director of a Regional Private Lands Program he openly encouraged and abetted the
development of several Group Ventures in his region because he did not have the staff
resources within his office to meet the demand for management plans and forestry services.
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may be used primarily for recreational access, or people may manage with little
intention of ever harvesting. In many individual programs, these practices are
often discouraged through rigid stipulations on assistance and linkage between
road building and silviculture work.2" Second, to a great extent, Group Ventures
can determine where work is performed and prioritization of work. This may or
may not conform with program goals. Third, though not initially so, Group
Ventures can average the costs of work performed in receiving payment.
While administrators relinquish some discretionary control over funds,
flexibility in fund usage and some discretionary power are essential to
development of dynamic and independent Groups. Due to changes in Group
needs and everyday operations, activities often do not conform exactly with annual
plans. Flexibility also encourages new members, whose interests may not be
narrowly on production, to join.
Conclusion
As noted at the outset to this chapter, for the Group Venture Program to
be successful, it must fulfill the goals of both woodlot owners concerned with
forest conditions and incomes, and government officials concerned with long-run
wood supply. Achievement of both sets of goals requires they be complimentary
and not present significant conflicts between local and government interests. For
20 Griffiths Mueke Associates, 1989:32-33. Requirements for US Department of
Agriculture road assistance (under the Forest Incentives Act) are very strict because "of the
risk of assisting road construction for primarily recreational purposes". In Maine, contracts
are being written to tie road construction and silviculture.
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Conform, though specific relations with some administrators and a few rules
limiting activities may have inhibited achievement of its goals, in general, program
rules provided an opportunity to improve the conditions of local woodlot owners.
For government, though the program has induced increased woodlot management,
higher management levels are desired. Program changes promoting Group
Venture efficiency to attain these supply goals have even been supported by most
Group Ventures, especially the more productive ones who stand to gain.
Conform, for example, has advocated a funding formula basing funding levels on
performance measures since the early 1980s. The importance of the
complementarity of goals was noted by Hundert et al. who write, "any potential
program to encourage greater productivity on small woodlots ... must meet, or
synchronize with, the objectives of the owners it seeks to motivate."" In the case
of forest assistance and the Group Venture Program, this is a relatively simple
task, requiring some release of control of program implementation, and some
flexibility and discretion on funding use. In other cases, such as marketing reform,
these goals are not so complementary, making changes less successful. Woodlot
owner market reform objectives are opposed by the forest industry, creating a split
amongst government administrators and politicians that inhibits significant
progress.
Conform's success relies in its ability to take advantage of the opportunities
presented by the Group Venture Program. Despite the lack of incentives for
perform efficiently, such as fixed operations funding, and program rules limiting
efficiency, such as restrictions on profiting from Forest Improvement work,
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2' Hundert et al. 1988:8.
Conform has developed into an independent, productive and healthy organization.
How Conform has achieved its success is the focus of this thesis. The analysis of
this chapter has shown that a combination of physical resource, membership,
market, and organizational factors were important to providing the conditions
under which Conform could succeed. Important physical resource factors include
a relatively good quality resource, and control of the means of production. A
historical predisposition to organizing, and skilled and experienced people to play
leadership roles are the most important membership and community factors
identified. Need for a market intermediary, reliability as a market supplier, and
proximity to markets are important market factors. Important rules and
organizational factors include: internal relations reflecting confidence in
management, fairness and flexibility to shareholders, and communication among
all collective members; a profit-oriented business philosophy; the ability to
recognize and make a number of particular management decisions crucial to
achieving group goals, and the incentives and structure provided by the Group
Venture Program.
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion
Small private woodlots, due to their fragmented size, dispersed spatial
distribution, and diverse goals of their owners, present a number of barriers the
achievement of social objectives for forests management. This "small woodlot
owner problem" presents difficulties to policy-makers attempting to induce
particular management practices, coordinate and increase smooth production of
future wood outputs, and, most recently, maintain ecological values. Collective
forest management offers the potential to address many of the economies of scale,
market, information, and contractor reliability problems deterring proper forest
management. By managing multiple woodlots as a single management unit,
collective management can provide more cost effective management, coordination
of marketing and maintenance activities, and full-service management for inactive
woodlots. In addition to these benefits to local collective members, collective
0
management can help achieve government goals of increasing forest production by
provide an administratively efficient, reliable, and financially effective mechanism
for delivering forest assistance.
Nova Scotia's high concentration of private woodlot ownership makes the
"small woodlot problem" particularly important to resource conditions and the
forest economy. Through the province's Group Venture Program, collective
management is promoted by providing incentives and an accepted model to local
communities interested in improving woodlot production and conditions. This
thesis analyzes the operations of Conform, Ltd. to identify the factors shaping its
operations as one of the province's most successful Group Ventures. A number
of particular factors have been identified:
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- Past community experiences with grass roots local development and
cooperatives that create a predisposition to the formation of organizations
to address local problems;
- Local individuals with skills and experiences in business, community
organizing, and forestry necessary to the formation, operations, and
leadership in developing Conform;
- Control of the means of production through equipment ownership and
supervising work crews to ensure the reliability, quality, low price, and
growth of harvesting and silviculture operations;
- Good resource conditions;
- Good and diverse markets in relatively close proximity, which, when
combined with good resource conditions, provide an adequate annual
production to sustain viable operations;
- Market relationships where Conform exhibits reliability as a producer of
wood products. This reliability will promote good relations and reduce the
potential threat a collective organization poses to existing forest industry
companies and actors;
- Market conditions where use of an intermediary is important to obtaining
market access or fair prices, or the costs of obtaining information, contacts,
and access are high.
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- Strong internal relations between board members, management and
shareholders, exhibiting confidence, fairness, flexibility, and communication;
- Business, or profit-oriented, philosophy;
- Particular business decisions to achieve some of the above conditions, such
as purchase of equipment, and supporting the marketing division;
- Group Venture Program incentives, including incorporation funding and
advice, operations funding, and a "model" operation to overcome barriers
to formation, and Forest Improvement funding to encourage membership;
These factors are important to the achievement of Conform's success, though
Conform may not represent the only model of a successful forest management
collective. Other collectives, with less production oriented objectives, may also
present excellent models under a different set of success criteria. Success is
defined here as attainment of local and government objectives through high levels
of production and management, and institutional independence, such that
Conform would likely continue operations if funding was eliminated.
Support of Nova Scotia's Group Venture program, and forestry assistance
in other regions, is based primarily on the goal of increasing woodlot productivity
and not the maintenance of ecological values. As ecological maintenance, and
other social concerns in rural areas, become a more prominent social goals,
however, collective forest management may become a more attractive option to
achieving these broader sets of production, social, and ecological goals. Current
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woodlot management criteria usually promote long-term forest renewal rather
than ecological maintenance. The ability to develop new management criteria
and coordinate management on large blocks of forest land makes collective forest
management an excellent mechanism to achieving this new set of ecological
objectives.
The transferability of this Program to another region seems to depend
upon a number of important factors. First, the need for collective management
on the local level must exist, including need for market intermediaries, interest by
local woodlot owners, and lack of suitable local management options. Second, a
government need that supports a commitment to consistent and significant
funding. Few forestry collectives have formed or continued operations with some
form of government support. Third, a willingness to relinquish some control over
the dispersal of funds and the objectives that individual collectives set for
themselves. Fourth, openness to the expansion of acceptable management terms.
It is becoming increasingly evident that woodlot owners have management
interests much broader than simply timber production. If allowed to manage for
all potential uses, greater membership may be attracted. The Group Venture
program is relatively flexible vis-a-vis woodlots are managed. Individual programs
in other jurisdictions have often showed less flexibility in supporting true multiple-
use forestry.
Future Research
This thesis has focussed upon the conditions and circumstances that have
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lead to collective forest management in Nova Scotia and, in particular, the
Musquodoboit Valley. Analysis of other Group Ventures may provide further
insight into the conditions for successful collective forest management. In
addition, a more complete analysis of the Group Venture program would help
determine its broad impacts upon the forest industry, rural economies, and the
resource condition. Lessons from such an analysis, which should be particularly
attuned to the institutional and political factors and the cost-effectiveness of the
Group Venture Program relative to alternative policies, may be applicable to
other regions facing similar problems.
A number of particular questions must be addressed about the Group
Venture program. First, an analysis should be made of the social impacts of the
Group Venture program. How are program benefits spread amongst woodlot
owners, contractors, woods workers and the forest industry? What are the
different social and income needs of the program's beneficiaries? A better
understanding is needed of relations within the local economy, and whether the
Group Ventures increases local income and investment. In reality, woodlot
owners may be financially well-off compared to woods workers and contractors
who rely upon the forest for their income.
Second, another important question is the impacts of Conform's, and the
Group Ventures', management upon forest renewal and ecology. This analysis
must consider management on collectively managed land, the program's effects
upon management of non-collectively managed land, and the geographic impacts
of placing more forestland under production. It appears as though Conform's
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operations, though clearly more focussed on harvesting and production, are
providing good forest renewal, harvesting within sustainable yields, and
maintaining forest ecologies. However, it has also created extensive road
networks that access large amounts of previously unmanaged land, subjecting
them to potential degradation.
A comparative study of the institutional and policy aspects of woodlot
owner organizations across Eastern Canada, Europe and the United States would
provide a greater understanding of not only the effects of organizing upon forest
industry structure, environmental outcomes, and rural livelihoods, but also how
the entire institutional and economic context supports or inhibits woodlot owner
empowerment. The performance of Group Ventures in Nova Scotia is relatively
strong compared to other collective management efforts in North America.
Group Ventures in Quebec operate under a very similar program, but appear to
have achieved less success: participation rates average under 10% of potential
woodlot owners," while Nova Scotia's program covers over 17% of potential
woodlot acreage.24 The reasons for this difference are unclear. Wood markets
are more highly regulated in Quebec, giving woodlot owners a better price on
pulp wood. The improved management economies resulting from increased prices
may increase woodlot owner interest in management, though it may also increase
reluctance to turn management over to a Group Venture for extended periods (up
to 15 years in Quebec) or pay the administration and management costs of the
22 Keith 1992:24. Keith reports that Conform is currently harvesting at its estimated
maximum sustained yield.
23 Curtis 1987:31.
24 Agfor 1991:6.
110
Group Venture. Collective management in the United States has been much
less successful, and has received much less governmental support. As a result,
services are generally limited to harvesting and marketing of wood. In contrast,
collective management in Sweden is much more effective, though it is bolstered by
an institutional structure regulating forest practices, limiting land transfers, and
supporting woodlot owner organization. The result is a system where forest
management is practiced by the woodlot owner because market conditions support
prices that warrant investments in woodlot management.
The problems facing the entire province with maintaining forest ecology
and productivity necessitate broad government intervention. Though many
observers have addressed facets of the political and institutional decisions
affecting the forest resource and economy sustainability, no one has yet analyzed
the entire institutional context in which efforts are made to better manage the
resource." The government's economic dependence upon a highly concentrated
forest industry, which precludes implementation of strict forest management
regulation, necessitates promotion of a forest improvement program that all can
agree upon -- i.e. direct funding of assistance. For marketing conditions, however,
there is no such linkage, since all cannot agree upon the need for improved
market conditions. As a result, conflict between small woodlot owners,
contractors, and mill owners effectively derails all government efforts to develop a
stable and fair system.
The net result of this inability to fashion adequate policies for all aspects
21 See Clancy and Sandberg 1992, where the authors begin to draw out a framework for
such an analysis.
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of the forest economy is a partial solution for resource maintenance and
diminished effectiveness of policies that are successfully implemented. The
effectiveness of and participation in Forestry Improvement, for example, is limited
because management incentives are absent without improved market conditions.
The program, if too successful at improving forest productivity, may actually
perpetuate the supply glut that supports the present depressed prices, thus
undermining efforts to further induce management. Unless significant new
capacity is developed in the near future to utilize supply increases and improve
market conditions, the program simply becomes a subsidization maintaining cheap
pulpwood prices for the three existing pulpwood corporations.
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Appendix I - Glossary of Terms
ARDA- Agricultural and Rural Development Act; before 1966, the Agricultural
and Rehabilitation and Development Act
DLF - Department of Lands and Forests
DNR - Department of Natural Resources
Harvesting - Cutting of trees with the primary goal of wood production, not
renewal.
Marketing Division - Also, Marketing District. An region in which a certified
bargaining agent negotiates with the region's pulp mill to determine the set
pulpwood price for all producers, and the annual quota for all members of
the Division.
MRDB - Musquodoboit Rural Development Board
NSWOA - Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners Association (1969-79)
NSWOOA - Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners and Operators Association (1979-
present)
Quota - A formal or informal agreement with a mill for delivery of a fixed
amount of wood, at an agreed price, on a regular schedule.
Roadside Price - The price paid for wood after harvesting left at the roadside for
transport. The most common price used for quoting wood prices.
Sawlogs - Logs harvested for lumber.
Service Area - The region defining woodlot owners eligible for membership in a
specific Group Venture.
Silviculture Treatments - Treatments to improve future forest productivity, such as
plantings, thinnings, and salvage.
Small woodlot owner - Typically, a woodlot owner with less than 1,000 acres of
land, though a criteria of 750 acres or 500 acres is often used.
Stumpage Price - Also stumpage rate. The economic rent, or value, of trees as
they stand (i.e. on the stump) to the landowner.
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Appendix II - People Interviewed and Contacts
Research included interviews performed in Nova Scotia over the period of
March 9 to 18, along with a few phone interviews. Among those interviewed are:
Harlan Redden, manager, Conform
John Dechman, former manager and President, Conform
Albert Higgins, President, Conform
Tim MacDonnel, member, Conform, silvicultural contractor
Byron Stewart, member, Conform
Fulton Andrews, member, Conform
Arden Widden, Department of Natural Resources
John Smith, Department of Natural Resources
Peter MacQuarrie, Department of Natural Resources
Graham Langley, Department of Natural Resources
Ian Miller, Forestry Canada (t)
David Dwyer, formerly, Department of Natural Resources
Eric Hundert, Environment Canada, former manager, North Mountain Group
Venture
Frank Crowdis, manager, North Inverness Group Venture (t)
(t) - telephone interview
Conform can be reached at:
Conform Ltd.
Middle Musquodboit
Halifax County, Nova Scotia BON 1XO
tel: (902) 384-2788
Information on the Group Venture Program can be obtained through:
Arden Whidden - director of Operations and Forest Management, Private Lands
Department of Natural Resources
2nd floor, Founders Square
1701 Hollis Street
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3J 2T9
tel: (902) 424-5704
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John Roblee, chairman
The Forest Group Venture Association of Nova Scotia
Box 248
Pugwash, Nova Scotia BOK 1LO
tel: (902) 447-3034
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